United States

This paper presents a theoretical description of metacognition in architectural design. The assumption is that metacognition happens when an architect expresses self-awareness and that’s likely to happen when he/she acquires a global view of the design process. Self-awareness does not necessarily mean high confidence rating, so this needs to be measured separately. During design, architects are immersed in a sequential decision-making process with limited links/references backwards and forwards to immediately adjacent design actions. At certain points during design, possibly evoked by a stimuli or a challenge, architects rise to a higher order awareness where they construct a global view of parts or the whole of the design process, and understand, in parts or in full, the structure and causalities underlying their design decisions within the context of the design process and perhaps within a wider context that is situated in the social world. This is where architects are likely to declare or express their level of confidence about the actions they have made thus far and set longer term strategies on how they are going to manage their design decisions.

CogSci 2023

Metacognition in architectural design

poster

The 45th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society will take place in Sydney, Australia as a modified hybrid conference. Presentations from the main-session room will be live-streamed every day for all events. This will include all invited talks and award sessions. Recordings of all CogSci 2023 sessions will be made available for on-demand viewing after the conference.<br>
The in-person component will be held at the International Convention Centre Sydney at Darling Harbour. The Conference will take place Wednesday July 26th – Saturday July 29th, 2023 (Wednesday, July 26th is the Workshops Day).

Join us!

<br>[**The Program at a Glance can be found here**](https://cognitivesciencesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/COgSci-PAAG-V2.pdf)
<br>[**The Detailed Program can be found here**](https://online.fliphtml5.com/ebtyf/mswz/)
<br><br>

#### **CogSci 2023 Program Book**
<iframe style="width:700px;height:400px" src="https://online.fliphtml5.com/ebtyf/tzgk/"  seamless="seamless" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allowfullscreen="true" ></iframe>
<br>

The 45th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society presents the latest research across cognitive science and highlights the theme of Cognition in Context.

There is debate about when children can think counterfactually about doubly-determined events (McCormack et al., 2018; Nyhout, Henke, & Ganea, 2017). We tested whether counterfactual thinking about past events, requiring mental time travel, was harder than thinking about ongoing events. 68 3- to 6-year-olds saw a box which lit up when activator blocks were placed on it. In doubly-determined current trials, a red and a blue block (both activators) were placed on the box which lit up. Children were asked “If we had not put the red block on the machine, would the light still be on now?” (Correct “yes”). In doubly-determined past trials, blocks were removed before questioning. 
Five- and six-year-olds found both versions easy. Three- to four-year-olds performed poorly. Four- to five-year-olds performed better than chance on current trials (p=.001), but at chance on past trials (p>.999). We relate this to Hoerl and McCormack’s (2018) dual systems perspective.

Counterfactuals and mental time travel

There is an ongoing debate in the scientific community regarding the nature of cognitive flexibility. It is either seen as a general ability, a task-dependent skill, or a dimensional construct composed of reactive flexibility and spontaneous flexibility. To develop the discussion, we compared first-graders’ performance on four cognitive flexibility tasks. Two tasks focused on reactive flexibility (rule-switching and verbally-cued-switching), and two targeted spontaneous flexibility (role-shifting and divergent thinking). We also used three tests of executive functions (cognitive inhibition, working memory, and processing speed) to evaluate their link with cognitive flexibility. Significant positive correlations emerged between all but one of the flexibility tasks, regardless of whether they targeted a reactive or spontaneous use of flexibility. Similarly, confirmatory factorial analysis did not provide evidence for the dimensional structure of cognitive flexibility. These results suggest that different flexibility tasks may tap into distinct aspects of a task-dependent ability, rather than a generalized competence.

Cognitive Flexibility Or Flexibilities? New Insights From A Classroom Study

The approximate number system, involved in the estimation of large numerosities, forms the basis for the development of mathematics ability. Although researchers have investigated the cognitive underpinnings of the approximate number system, the specific underlying cognitive abilities involved need better theorisation. There have also been conflicting findings regarding the relationship between the approximate number system and mathematics ability. Therefore, the current study had twofold objectives: 1) To investigate the cognitive underpinning of the approximate number system. 2) To test whether the approximate number system can predict mathematics ability. A total of 31 primary school children participated in the study. To measure approximate number system and mathematics ability, non-symbolic number comparison and arithmetic fluency tasks were used, respectively. Using repeated measure ANCOVA and multilinear regressions, results revealed that only inhibitory control played a significant role in the approximate number system. Furthermore, the approximate number system could not predict arithmetic fluency.

Investigation into Approximate Number System: Cognitive Underpinnings and Relationship with Arithmetic Fluency

The main goal of this study was to explore this adaptation of a group of Mexican people with DS aged 12-30 years during the COVID-19 pandemic. We analyze the relationships among eight domains of executive function and mental and chronological age. The participants were 50 people with DS with a chronological age (CA) of 12-30 years and a mean mental age (MA) of 7 years. MA was evaluated with Raven’s Progressive Matrices test and executive function with the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF-2); both were administered online. The Monitor, Emotional Control, Initiative, and Organization of Materials scales showed strengths, while Working Memory, Plan/Organize, Shift, and Inhibit showed weaknesses. CA correlated negatively with seven of the eight executive domains, while MA correlated negatively with two. Participants’ executive profile during the COVID-19 pandemic is consistent with that reported in previous research, and the findings are discussed in cognitive regulation process.

Executive Functioning skills in young Mexicans with Down syndrome during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Older adults can experience declines in their cognitive abilities, which could affect their ability to engage in daily activities such as driving. Here, we compare the driving habits of older adults across different cognitive groups: cognitively healthy older adults (control), Subjective Cognitive Decline (SCD), Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), and Alzheimer’s Disease (AD). We analyzed data from the large-scale Comprehensive Assessment of Neurodegeneration and Dementia study (COMPASS-ND, Chertkow et al., 2019). Results revealed that the AD group drove the least often and shortest distances. Interestingly, on several measures, the SCD group was more like the MCI group than the control group (driving frequency, restrictions), suggesting that even subjective declines were associated with differences in driving habits. We will further discuss how these results are influenced by sensory and demographic factors. Driving-related limitations could reduce older adults’ participation and access to essential resources, in turn, negatively affecting their physical and mental health.

Driving Habits of a Cohort of Older Canadians: A COMPASS-ND Study

As a prime step in the empirical research cycle, we rely on language to define the constituted concepts. In the plethora of scholarly output, we often find a wide range of discrepant definitions of a given concept manifested by varied linguistic expressions. Capturing the linguistic variability of de facto concept definitions helps researchers assess how convergent our understanding of a concept has become and how falsifiable the associated theory is. To estimate the falsifiability of operational definitions, we proposed and validated proxy measures using natural language processing (NLP) techniques. As a use case study, we quantified the variability of operational definitions of 216 subordinate concepts associated with "open scholarship". We aggregated 2212 operational definitions from online thesauruses and scientific texts and explored the validity of the proposed proxies of definitions' informativeness. Our study brings new perspectives on reappraising the role of language in constructing falsifiable theories.

In search of proxy measures of falsifiability of operational definitions: A cognitive linguistic perspective

The existence of a domain-general ‘cognitive map’ system that can be used flexibly to represent physical spaces and conceptual spaces has been suggested in recent work. Activation in brain regions commonly associated with spatial navigation, such as the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex - a critical hub for grid cells - has been observed during tasks such as representing a social network or abstract conceptual relations. To demonstrate a behavioral parallel between abstract and physical navigation, we developed a novel task in which participants represented relational statements (e.g., Joe is smarter than Steve) in space along two dimensions. Uniformity, defined as how closely the representations adhered to a grid cell-like pattern, correlated with self-reported sense of direction and spatial habits of mind. This supports extant research proposing a flexible cognitive map system used for representing both physical space and conceptual relations, providing insight about the inherent grid structure utilized in spatial representations.

Uniform Patterns in Spatial Representations of Abstract Information Are Predicted by Sense of Direction and Spatial Habits of Mind

Following the abandonment of the three-year strict zero-COVID strategy in China, the National Health Commission of China announced the renaming of COVID-19 in Chinese from “新冠肺炎” (novel coronavirus pneumonia, NCP) to “新冠感染” (novel coronavirus infection, NCI) in December, 2022, which may help to reduce people’s fear of COVID-19. We investigated whether the name change affected Chinese people’s (N=1256) perception of COVID immediately after the announcement. The results showed that when explicitly asked about the difference between the two names, about 65% of the individuals perceived NCP as a more serious threat to health and more frightening than NCI. However, when the questions were posed implicitly, the effect of renaming interacted with individuals’ direct and indirect COVID experience. This study thus provides insight into the role of language in shaping people's perception, particularly its interaction with people’s bodily and knowledge/social experience.

What’s new in a name? Chinese people’s perception of the renaming of COVID-19

Over the last decade, cognitive science and allied fields have been criticized for being excessively “WEIRD,” i.e., overly reliant on participants from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies. The lack of diversity among research participants is now widely acknowledged, but it’s a rather superficial problem, symptomatic of other more fundamental ones. This poster outlines what we see as four overlapping problems. Cognitive science is WEIRD not only in terms of who makes up its participant pool, but also in terms of its theoretical commitments (e.g., individualism and universalism), methodological assumptions (e.g., measurement and analysis methods), and institutional structures (e.g., funding and publishing). Merely solving the problem of WEIRD participants by sampling more widely is insufficient to address cognitive science’s more fundamental WEIRD theoretical, methodological and institutional problems. Coming to terms with this is necessary if we wish to make cognitive science relevant for all humanity.

How WEIRD is Cognitive Science?

Recent studies and models have been successful in describing human search in choice-rich environments in terms of different generalization and exploration strategies. However, it remains an open question how and to what extent people adapt these strategies to different environments. Therefore, we used a within-subject manipulation to study human search in two classes of environments, where the reward distributions differed in the strength of spatial correlations. These environments were chosen through simulations designed to maximize the need for deploying different generalization strategies. We describe participant behavior with the parameters of a model using Gaussian Process function learning to generalize and an Upper Confidence Bound to sample from unexplored options. Our results show that while participants adapted their exploration strategies, their generalization remained unchanged across environments. Together, these findings offer important first insights into how people adapt decision-making strategies depending on environmental demands in vast decision spaces.

Premium content

Metacognition in architectural design

Next from CogSci 2023

Counterfactuals and mental time travel

Stay up to date with the latest Underline news!

PRESENTATIONS

CONFERENCES

COMPANY

RESOURCES