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As AI agents are increasingly adopted to collaborate on complex objectives, ensuring the security of multi-agent systems becomes crucial. The risk of security breaches in these systems creates a fundamental trade-off between increasing protective measures and maintaining collaborative effectiveness.
To study these security risks and trade-offs, we create simulations of agents collaborating on assigned tasks. We focus on scenarios where an attacker compromises one agent, using it to steer the entire system towards misaligned outcomes by corrupting other agents. In this context, we observe "infectious jailbreaks" - the multi-hop spreading of malicious prompts. To mitigate this risk, we evaluate several strategies: two "vaccination" approaches that insert false memories of safely handling malicious inputs into the agents' memory stream, and two versions of a generic safety prompt strategy.
We find that while these mitigation strategies significantly reduce the likelihood of infectious jailbreaks, they differentially impact the collaboration capabilities of the multi-agent system. Our findings demonstrate a general trade-off between security and collaborative efficiency in multi-agent systems, providing insights for designing more secure yet effective AI collaborations.
