Abstract:

Repeated observations that humans do not maximize self interest in behavioral economic games suggest that we have prosocial preferences that motivate how we cooperate. However, because people may import local cultural norms into the game setting, it is hard to know the extent to which these preferences are rooted in an inherently prosocial psychology, or whether they stem from a psychology that promotes adherence to local cultural norms. We designed a study to assess the extent to which individuals’ norm compliance disposition explained their prosocial behavior in economic games. Participants were recruited from college student populations in a norm-loose society, the Netherlands (n=300), and a norm-tight society, Turkey (n=300). Norm compliance disposition in each population was experimentally assessed through a task involving 50 culturally specific norms. We found that norm compliance disposition was a significant predictor of individuals’ prosocial behavior (Dictator game giving, prosocial punishment spending), and not of their antisocial behavior (Destruction game spending, antisocial punishment spending). Our results imply that prosocial behavior is highly sensitive to prevailing norms, and that substantive levels of cooperation can be elicited even without a prosocial psychology—if there are cultural evolutionary processes favoring norms with prosocial content.

Speaker's social media:

@SarahMathew1