
Many scientific conferences employ a two-phase paper review process, where some papers are assigned additional reviewers after the initial reviews are submitted. Many conferences also design and run experiments on their paper review process, where some papers are assigned reviewers who provide reviews under an experimental condition. In this paper, we consider the question: how should reviewers be divided between phases or conditions in order to maximize total assignment similarity? We make several contributions towards answering this question. First, we prove that when the set of papers requiring additional review is unknown, a simplified variant of this problem is NP-hard. Second, we empirically show that across several datasets pertaining to real conference data, dividing reviewers between phases/conditions uniformly at random allows an assignment that is nearly as good as the oracle optimal assignment. This uniformly random choice is practical for both the two-phase and conference experiment design settings. Third, we provide explanations of this phenomenon by providing theoretical bounds on the suboptimality of this random strategy under certain natural conditions. From these easily-interpretable conditions, we provide actionable insights to conference program chairs about whether a random reviewer split is suitable for their conference.

Near-Optimal Reviewer Splitting in Two-Phase Paper Reviewing and Conference Experiment Design

We pose and study the problem of planning in Markov decision processes (MDPs), subject to participation constraints as studied in mechanism design. In this problem, a planner must work with a self-interested agent on a given MDP. Each action in the MDP provides an immediate reward to the planner and a (possibly different) reward to the agent. The agent has no control in choosing the actions, but has the option to end the entire process at any time. The goal of the planner is to find a policy that maximizes her cumulative reward, taking into consideration the agent's ability to terminate.
    
We give a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for this problem.  En route, we present polynomial-time algorithms for computing (exact) optimal policies for important special cases of this problem, including when the time horizon is constant, or when the MDP exhibits a "definitive decisions" property. We illustrate our algorithms with two different game-theoretic applications: the problem of assigning rides in ride-sharing and the problem of designing screening policies. Our results imply efficient algorithms for computing (approximately) optimal policies in both applications.

Planning with Participation Constraints

We study the problem of learning influence adoption in networks. In this problem, a communicable entity (such as an infectious disease, a computer virus, or a social media meme) propagates through a network, and the goal is to learn the state of each individual node by sampling only a small number of nodes and observing/testing their states. We study this problem in heterogeneous networks, in which each individual node has a set of distinct features that determine how it is affected by the propagating entity. We give an efficient algorithm with nearly optimal sample complexity for two variants of this learning problem, corresponding to symptomatic and asymptomatic spread. In each case, the optimal sample complexity naturally generalizes the complexity of learning how nodes are affected in isolation, and the complexity of learning influence adoption in a homogeneous network.

Learning Influence Adoption in Heterogeneous Networks

New Design Decisions for Modern AI Agents

A set of players delegate playing a game to a set of representatives, one for each player. We imagine that each player trusts their respective representative's strategic abilities. Thus, we might imagine that per default, the original players would simply instruct the representatives to play the original game as best as they can. In this paper, we ask: are there safe Pareto improvements on this default way of giving instructions? That is, we imagine that the original players can coordinate to tell their representatives to only consider some subset of the available strategies and to assign utilities to outcomes differently than the original players. Then can the original players do this in such a way that the payoff is guaranteed to be weakly higher than under the default instructions for all the original players? In particular, can they Pareto-improve without probabilistic assumptions about how the representatives play games? In this paper, we give some examples of safe Pareto improvements. We prove that the notion of safe Pareto improvements is closely related to a notion of outcome correspondence between games. We also show that under some specific assumptions about how the representatives play games, finding safe Pareto improvements is NP-complete.

Safe Pareto Improvements for Delegated Game Playing

Designing Agents’ Preferences, Beliefs, and Identities

We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced by the principal's limited verification power. We prove hardness results when the revelation principle does not necessarily hold, as well as when types have even minimally different preferences. In light of these hardness results, we focus on truthful mechanisms in the setting where all types share the same preference over outcomes, which is motivated by applications in, e.g., strategic classification. We present a number of algorithmic and structural results, including an efficient algorithm for finding optimal deterministic truthful mechanisms, which also implies a faster algorithm for finding optimal randomized truthful mechanisms via a characterization based on the notion of convexity. We then consider a more general setting, where the principal's cost is a function of the combination of outcomes assigned to each type. In particular, we focus on the case where the cost function is submodular, and give generalizations of essentially all our results in the classical setting where the cost function is additive. Our results provide a relatively complete picture for automated mechanisms design with partial verification.

Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification

We study PAC learning in the presence of strategic manipulation, where data points may modify their features in certain predefined ways in order to receive a better outcome. We show that the vanilla ERM principle fails to achieve any nontrivial guarantee in this context. Instead, we propose an incentive-aware version of the ERM principle which has asymptotically optimal sample complexity. We then focus our attention on incentive-compatible classifiers, which provably prevent any kind of strategic manipulation. We give a sample complexity bound that is, curiously, independent of the hypothesis class, for the ERM principle restricted to incentive-compatible classifiers. This suggests that incentive compatibility alone can act as an effective means of regularization. We further show that it is without loss of generality to consider only incentive-compatible classifiers when opportunities for strategic manipulation satisfy a transitivity condition. As a consequence, in such cases, our hypothesis-class-independent sample complexity bound applies even without incentive compatibility. Our results set the foundations of incentive-aware PAC learning.

Incentive-Aware PAC Learning

We study test-based binary classification, where a principal either accepts or rejects agents based on the outcomes they get in a set of tests.  The principal commits to a policy, which consists of all sets of outcomes that lead to acceptance.  Each agent is modeled by a distribution over the space of possible outcomes.  When an agent takes a test, he pays a cost and receives an independent sample from his distribution as the outcome.  Agents can always choose between taking another test and stopping.  They maximize their expected utility, which is the value of acceptance if the principal's policy accepts the set of outcomes they have and 0 otherwise, minus the total cost of tests taken.

We focus on the case where agents can be either "good" or "bad" (corresponding to their distribution over test outcomes), and the principal's goal is to accept good agents and reject bad ones.  We show, roughly speaking, that as long as the good and bad agents have different distributions (which can be arbitrarily close to each other), the principal can always achieve perfect accuracy, meaning good agents are accepted with probability 1, and bad ones are rejected with probability 1.  Moreover, there is a policy achieving perfect accuracy under which the maximum number of tests any agent needs to take is constant â€” in sharp contrast to the case where the principal directly observes samples from agents' distributions.  The key technique is to choose the policy so that agents self-select into taking tests.

Classification with Few Tests through Self-Selection

AI systems are often used to make or contribute to important decisions in a growing range of applications, including criminal justice, hiring, and medicine. Since these decisions impact human lives, it is important that the AI systems act in ways which align with human values. Techniques for preference modeling and social choice help researchers learn and aggregate peoples' preferences, which are used to guide AI behavior; thus, it is imperative that these learned preferences are accurate. These techniques often assume that people are willing to express strict preferences over alternatives; which is not true in practice. People are often indecisive, and especially so when their decision has moral implications. The philosophy and psychology literature shows that indecision is a measurable and nuanced behavior---and that there are several different reasons people are indecisive. This complicates the task of both learning and aggregating preferences, since most of the relevant literature makes restrictive assumptions on the meaning of indecision. We begin to close this gap by formalizing several mathematical indecision models based on theories from philosophy, psychology, and economics; these models can be used to describe (indecisive) agent decisions, both when they are allowed to express indecision and when they are not. We test these models using data collected from an online survey where participants choose how to (hypothetically) allocate organs to patients waiting for a transplant.

Indecision Modeling

Machine learning techniques can be useful in applications such as credit approval and college admission. However, to be classified more favorably in such contexts, an agent may decide to strategically withhold some of her features, such as bad test scores.  This is a missing data problem with a twist: which data is missing depends on the chosen classifier, because the specific classifier is what may create the incentive to withhold certain feature values. We address the problem of training classifiers that are robust to this behavior.

We design three classification methods: MINCUT, Hill-Climbing (HC) and Incentive-Compatible Logistic Regression (IC-LR). We show that MINCUT is optimal when the true distribution of data is fully known. However, it can produce complex decision boundaries, and hence be prone to overfitting in some cases. Based on a characterization of truthful classifiers (i.e., those that give no incentive to strategically hide features), we devise a simpler alternative called HC which consists of a hierarchical ensemble of out-of-the-box classifiers, trained using a specialized hill-climbing procedure which we show to be convergent. For several reasons, MINCUT and HC are not effective in utilizing a large number of complementarily informative features. To this end, we present IC-LR, a modification of Logistic Regression that removes the incentive to strategically drop features. We also show that our algorithms perform well in experiments on real-world data sets, and present insights into their relative performance in different settings.

Classification with Strategically withheld Data

For many applications, human cognitive limitations are something that poses challenging constraints. In this paper, I argue that they also have their advantages: they enable new systems and functionality that would be impossible without them. This creates an opportunity for new and exciting interdisciplinary collaborations between cognitive science and computer science.

Using Human Cognitive Limitations to Enable New Systems

Poster & Demo Session PD2C

poster

AAMAS (International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems) is the largest and most influential conference in the area of agents and multiagent systems. The aim of the conference is to bring together researchers and practitioners in all areas of agent technology and to provide a single, high-profile, internationally renowned forum for research in the theory and practice of autonomous agents and multiagent systems. AAMAS is the flagship conference of the non-profit International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

The AAMAS conference series was initiated in 2002 in Bologna, Italy as a joint event comprising the 6th International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AA), the 5th International Conference on Multiagent Systems (ICMAS), and the 9th International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL).

Subsequent AAMAS conferences have been held in Melbourne, Australia (July 2003), New York City, NY, USA (July 2004), Utrecht, The Netherlands (July 2005), Hakodate, Japan (May 2006), Honolulu, Hawaii, USA (May 2007), Estoril, Portugal (May 2008), Budapest, Hungary (May 2009), Toronto, Canada (May 2010), Taipei, Taiwan (May 2011), Valencia, Spain (June 2012), Minnesota, USA (May 2013), Paris, France (May 2014), Istanbul, Turkey (May 2015), Singapore (May 2016), São Paulo (2017) and Stockholm, Sweden (2018), Montreal (May 2019), Auckland (May 2020, Virtual), London (May 2021, Virtual).
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AAMAS 2022

AAMAS (International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems) is the largest and most influential conference in the area of agents and multiagent systems. The aim of the conference is to bring together researchers and practitioners in all areas of agent technology and to provide a single, high-profile, internationally renowned forum for research in the theory and practice of autonomous agents and multiagent systems. AAMAS is the flagship conference of the non-profit International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

Main_Track

technical paper

The purpose of the AAAI conference is to promote research in artificial intelligence (AI) and scientific exchange among AI researchers, practitioners, scientists, and engineers in affiliated disciplines. 

AAAI 2022



**Session chair:** Ulle Endriss

**Abstract:** Consider an intelligent virtual assistant such as Siri, or perhaps a more capable future version of it.  Should we think of all of Siri as one big agent? Or is there a separate agent on every phone, each with its own objectives and/or beliefs? And what should those objectives and beliefs be? Such questions reveal that the traditional, somewhat anthropomorphic model of an agent – with clear boundaries, centralized belief formation and decision making, and a clear given objective – falls short for thinking about today’s AI systems. We need better methods for specifying the objectives that these agents should pursue in the real world, especially when their actions have ethical implications. I will discuss some methods that we have been developing for this purpose, drawing on techniques from preference elicitation and computational social choice. But we need to specify more than objectives. When agents are distributed, systematically forget what they knew before (say, for privacy reasons), and potentially face copies of themselves, it is no longer obvious what the correct way is even to do probabilistic reasoning, let alone to make optimal decisions. I will explain why this is so and discuss our work on doing these things well. (No previous background required.)

*Vincent Conitzer will give this talk on the occasion of receiving the ACM/SIGAI Autonomous Agents Research Award for his work on multiagent systems spanning interdisciplinary areas in game theory, social choice, and economics.*

Keynote: Vincent Conitzer - New Design Decisions for Modern AI Agents

keynote

AAMAS is the largest and most influential conference in the area of agents and multiagent systems, bringing together researchers and practitioners in all areas of agent technology and providing and internationally renowned high-profile forum for publishing and finding out about the latest developments in the field. AAMAS is the flagship conference of the non-profit International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).  

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AAMAS 2021

S1: Game Theory 6

[![](https://assets.underline.io/uploads/markdown_image/1/image/f30fd5693c8c6679c5c1a4ca33305ccb.png)](https://users.cs.duke.edu/~conitzer/AAAI21agentdesigntutorial.html) 

**Tutorial presenter:** Vincent Conitzer

Tutorial: Designing Agents’ Preferences, Beliefs, and Identities

tutorial

AAMAS is the largest and most influential conference in the area of agents and multiagent systems, bringing together researchers and practitioners in all areas of agent technology and providing and internationally renowned high-profile forum for publishing and finding out about the latest developments in the field. AAMAS is the flagship conference of the non-profit International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).  

AAMAS 2021 Workshops & Tutorials

Main Track

AAAI 2021

Blue Sky Session

The 8th AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (HCOMP 2020) will be held October 26–28th virtually at The Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision in Hilversum, The Netherlands.

While artificial intelligence (AI) and human-computer interaction (HCI) represent traditional mainstays of the conference, HCOMP believes strongly in fostering and promoting broad, interdisciplinary research. Our field is particularly unique in the diversity of disciplines it draws upon and contributes to, including human-centered qualitative studies and HCI design, social computing, artificial intelligence, economics, computational social science, digital humanities, policy, and ethics. We promote the exchange of advances in human computation and crowdsourcing not only among researchers, but also engineers and practitioners, to encourage dialogue across disciplines and communities of practice.

This year, we especially invite works that will generate new insights into the quality (or qualities) of human-annotated datasets, including elements such as reliability and replicability of human computation and crowdsourcing experiments, novel metrics for aggregation of results, and holistic approaches to deal with bias, fairness and interpretability.

HCOMP 2020

HCOMP believes strongly in fostering and promoting broad, interdisciplinary research. Our field is particularly unique in the diversity of disciplines it draws upon and contributes to, including human-centered qualitative studies and HCI design, social computing, artificial intelligence, economics, computational social science, digital humanities, policy, and ethics. 


Vincent Conitzer

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SHORT BIO

Presentations