Online platforms sell advertisements via auctions (e.g., VCG and GSP auction) and revenue maximization is one of the most important tasks for them. Many revenue increment methods are proposed, like reserve pricing, boosting, coupons and so on. The novelty of coupons rests on the fact that coupons are optional for advertisers while the others are compulsory. Recent studies on coupons have limited applications in advertising systems because they only focus on second price auctions and do not consider the combination with other methods. In this work, we study the coupon design problem for revenue maximization in the widely used VCG auction. Firstly, we examine the bidder strategies in the VCG auction with coupons. Secondly, we cast the coupon design problem into a learning framework and propose corresponding algorithms using the properties of VCG auction. Then we further study how to combine coupons with reserve pricing in our framework. Finally, extensive experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms based on both synthetic data and industrial data.

Coupon Design in Advertising Systems

Online advertising has been one of the most important sources for industry's growth, where the demand-side platforms (DSP) play an important role via bidding to the ad exchanges on behalf of their advertiser clients. Since more and more ad exchanges have shifted from second to first price auctions, it is challenging for DSPs to adjust bidding strategy in the volatile environment. Recent studies on bid shading in first-price auctions may have limited performance due to relatively strong hypotheses about winning probability distribution. Moreover, these studies do not consider the incentive of advertiser clients, which can be crucial for a reliable advertising platform. In this work, we consider both the optimization of bid shading technique and the design of internal auction which is ex-post incentive compatible (IC) for the management of a DSP. Firstly, we prove that the joint design of bid shading and ex-post IC auction can be reduced to choosing one monotone bid function for each advertiser without loss of optimality. Then we propose a parameterized neural network to implement the monotone bid functions. With well-designed surrogate loss, the objective can be optimized in an end-to-end manner. Finally, our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of our algorithm.

Simultaneous Optimization of Bid Shading and Internal Auction for Demand-Side Platforms

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technical paper

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Yadong Xu

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Coupon Design in Advertising Systems

Simultaneous Optimization of Bid Shading and Internal Auction for Demand-Side Platforms

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