Bilateral trade is one of the most natural and important forms of economic interaction: A seller has a single, indivisible item for sale, and a buyer is potentially interested. The two parties typically have different, privately known valuations for the item, and ideally, they would like to trade if the buyer values the item more than the seller. The celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite shows that any mechanism for this setting must violate at least one important desideratum. In this paper, we investigate a richer paradigm of bilateral trade, with many self-interested buyers and sellers on both sides of a single trade who cannot be excluded from the trade. We show that this allows for more positive results. In fact, we establish a dichotomy in the possibility of trading efficiently. If in expectation, the buyers value the item more, we can achieve efficiency in the limit. If this is not the case, then efficiency cannot be achieved in general. En route, we characterize trading mechanisms that encourage truth-telling, which may be of independent interest. We also evaluate our trading mechanisms experimentally, and the experiments align with our theoretical results.

Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups

Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify utilities
precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions we compute are not
robust to errors in this specification.  Ordinal games provide an
attractive alternative: they require specifying only which outcomes
are preferred to which other ones.  Unfortunately, they provide little
guidance for how to play unless there are pure Nash equilibria;
evaluating mixed strategies appears to fundamentally require cardinal
utilities.

In this paper, we observe that we can in fact make good use of mixed
strategies in ordinal games if we consider settings that allow for
folk theorems.  These allow us to find equilibria that are robust, in
the sense that they remain equilibria no matter which cardinal
utilities are the correct ones -- as long as they are consistent with
the specified ordinal preferences.  We analyze this concept and study
the computational complexity of finding such equilibria in a range of
settings.

The Complexity of Computing Robust Mediated Equilibria in Ordinal Games | VIDEO

AI systems can interact in unexpected ways, sometimes with disastrous consequences. As AI gets to control more of our world, these interactions will become more common and have higher stakes. As AI becomes more advanced, these interactions will become more sophisticated, and game theory will provide the tools for analyzing these interactions. However, AI agents are in some ways unlike the agents traditionally studied in game theory, introducing new challenges as well as opportunities. We propose a research agenda to develop the game theory of highly advanced AI agents, with a focus on achieving cooperation.

Foundations of Cooperative AI

Consider an intelligent virtual assistant such as Siri, or perhaps a more capable future version of it. Should we think of all of Siri as one big agent? Or is there a separate agent on every phone, each with its own objectives and/or beliefs? And what should those objectives and beliefs be? Such questions reveal that the traditional, somewhat anthropomorphic model of an agent – with clear boundaries, centralized belief formation and decision making, and a clear given objective – falls short for thinking about today’s AI systems. We need better methods for specifying the objectives that these agents should pursue in the real world, especially when their actions have ethical implications. I will discuss some methods that we have been developing for this purpose, drawing on techniques from preference elicitation and computational social choice. But we need to specify more than objectives. When agents are distributed, systematically forget what they knew before (say, for privacy reasons), can be simulated by others, and potentially face copies of themselves, it is no longer obvious what the correct way is even to do probabilistic reasoning, let alone to make optimal decisions. I will explain why this is so and discuss our work on doing these things well. (No previous background required.)

New Design Decisions for Modern AI Agents

Main Track - Game Theory and Economic Paradigms

technical paper

We are pleased to announce the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-24), which will be held in Vancouver, British Columbia at the Vancouver Convention Centre – West Building from 20-27 February, 2024.

The purpose of the AAAI conference series is to promote research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and foster scientific exchange between researchers, practitioners, scientists, students, and engineers across the entirety of AI and its affiliated disciplines. AAAI-24 will feature technical paper presentations, special tracks, invited speakers, workshops, tutorials, poster sessions, senior member presentations, competitions, and exhibit programs, and a range of other activities to be announced.

We expect for AAAI-24 to be an in-person conference – one author of all accepted papers will be expected to present work in person unless there are exceptional circumstances that prevent this.

In order to access the AAAI-24 event page you need to register [here](https://aaai.org/aaai-conference/registration/)

AAAI 2024

The purpose of the AAAI conference series is to promote research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and foster scientific exchange between researchers, practitioners, scientists, students, and engineers across the entirety of AI and its affiliated disciplines. 

Senior Member Track Talks 2

The purpose of the AAAI conference series is to promote research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and foster scientific exchange between researchers, practitioners, scientists, students, and engineers across the entirety of AI and its affiliated disciplines. AAAI-23 is the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. The theme of this conference is to create collaborative bridges within and beyond AI. Like previous AAAI conferences, AAAI-23 will feature technical paper presentations, special tracks, invited speakers, workshops, tutorials, poster sessions, senior member presentations, competitions, and exhibit programs, and two new activities: a Bridge Program and a Lab Program. Many of these activities are tailored to the theme of bridges and all are selected according to the highest standards, with additional programs for students and young researchers. 
AAAI is providing you with a conference planner, which you can use to help organize your itinerary of activities. This includes talks to attend in person, talks to attend remotely, breaks with colleagues and your site seeing activities. To access this conference planner, please go to [https://aaai-2023.takemobi.io](https://aaai-2023.takemobi.io).

In order to access this site, you need to register. If you haven't already, please register [here](https://aaai.org/Conferences/AAAI-23/registration/).


AAAI 2023

The purpose of the AAAI conference series is to promote research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and foster scientific exchange between researchers, practitioners, scientists, students, and engineers across the entirety of AI and its affiliated disciplines.

**Presenter:** [Vincent Conitzer](https://underline.io/speakers/5902-vincent-conitzer) (Carnegie Mellon University) 
**Talk Title:** New Design Decisions for Modern AI Agents 
**Abstract:** Consider an intelligent virtual assistant such as Siri, or perhaps a more capable future version of it. Should we think of all of Siri as one big agent? Or is there a separate agent on every phone, each with its own objectives and/or beliefs? And what should those objectives and beliefs be? Such questions reveal that the traditional, somewhat anthropomorphic model of an agent – with clear boundaries, centralized belief formation and decision making, and a clear given objective – falls short for thinking about today’s AI systems. We need better methods for specifying the objectives that these agents should pursue in the real world, especially when their actions have ethical implications. I will discuss some methods that we have been developing for this purpose, drawing on techniques from preference elicitation and computational social choice. But we need to specify more than objectives. When agents are distributed, systematically forget what they knew before (say, for privacy reasons), can be simulated by others, and potentially face copies of themselves, it is no longer obvious what the correct way is even to do probabilistic reasoning, let alone to make optimal decisions. I will explain why this is so and discuss our work on doing these things well. (No previous background required.)

Vincent Conitzer

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SHORT BIO

Presentations

Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups

The Complexity of Computing Robust Mediated Equilibria in Ordinal Games | VIDEO

Foundations of Cooperative AI

New Design Decisions for Modern AI Agents

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