Prior work has successfully incorporated optimization layers as the last layer in neural networks for various problems, thereby allowing joint learning and planning in one neural network forward pass. In this work, we identify a weakness in such a set-up where inputs to the optimization layer lead to undefined output of the neural network. Such undefined decision outputs can lead to possible catastrophic outcomes in critical real time applications. We show that an adversary can cause such failures by forcing rank deficiency on the matrix fed to the optimization layer which results in the optimization failing to produce a solution. We provide a defense for the failure cases by controlling the condition number of the input matrix. We study the problem in the settings of synthetic data, Jigsaw Sudoku, and in speed planning for autonomous driving. We show that our proposed defense effectively prevents the framework from failing with undefined output. Finally, we surface a number of edge cases which lead to serious bugs in popular optimization solvers which can be abused as well.

Beyond NaN: Resiliency of Optimization Layers in The Face of Infeasibility

This paper studies the problem of multi-step manipulative attacks in Stackelberg security games, in which a clever attacker attempts to orchestrate its attacks over multiple time steps to mislead the defender's learning of the attacker's behavior. This attack manipulation eventually influences the defender's patrol strategy towards the attacker's benefit. Previous work along this line of research only focuses on one-shot games in which the defender learns the attacker's behavior and then designs a corresponding strategy only once. Our work, on the other hand, investigates the long-term impact of the attacker's manipulation in which current attack and defense choices of players determine the future learning and patrol planning of the defender. This paper has three key contributions. First, we introduce a new multi-step manipulative attack game model that captures the impact of sequential manipulative attacks carried out by the attacker over the entire time horizon. Second, we propose a new algorithm to compute an optimal manipulative attack plan for the attacker, which tackles the challenge of multiple connected optimization components involved in the computation across multiple time steps. Finally, we present extensive experimental results on the impact of such misleading attacks, showing a significant benefit for the attacker and loss for the defender.  

Behavioral Learning in Security Games: Threat of Multi-Step Manipulative Attacks

This paper studies defender patrol deception in general Stackelberg security games (SSGs), where a defender attempts to alter the attacker's perception of the defender's patrolling intensity so as to influence the attacker's decision making. We are interested in understanding the complexity and effectiveness of optimal defender deception under different attacker behavior models. Specifically, we consider three different attacker strategies of response (to the defender's deception) with increasing sophistication, and design efficient polynomial-time algorithms to compute the equilibrium for each. Moreover, we prove formal separation for the effectiveness of patrol deception when facing an attacker of increasing sophistication, until it becomes even harmful to the defender when facing the most intelligent attacker we consider. Our results shed light on when and how deception should be used in SSGs. We conduct extensive experiments to illustrate our theoretical results in various game settings.

When Can the Defender Effectively Deceive Attackers in Security Games?

Posters & Demos III

poster

The purpose of the AAAI conference series is to promote research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and foster scientific exchange between researchers, practitioners, scientists, students, and engineers across the entirety of AI and its affiliated disciplines. AAAI-23 is the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. The theme of this conference is to create collaborative bridges within and beyond AI. Like previous AAAI conferences, AAAI-23 will feature technical paper presentations, special tracks, invited speakers, workshops, tutorials, poster sessions, senior member presentations, competitions, and exhibit programs, and two new activities: a Bridge Program and a Lab Program. Many of these activities are tailored to the theme of bridges and all are selected according to the highest standards, with additional programs for students and young researchers. 
AAAI is providing you with a conference planner, which you can use to help organize your itinerary of activities. This includes talks to attend in person, talks to attend remotely, breaks with colleagues and your site seeing activities. To access this conference planner, please go to [https://aaai-2023.takemobi.io](https://aaai-2023.takemobi.io).

In order to access this site, you need to register. If you haven't already, please register [here](https://aaai.org/Conferences/AAAI-23/registration/).


AAAI 2023

The purpose of the AAAI conference series is to promote research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and foster scientific exchange between researchers, practitioners, scientists, students, and engineers across the entirety of AI and its affiliated disciplines.

ML: Adversarial Learning & Robustness 2

Main_Track

technical paper

The purpose of the AAAI conference is to promote research in artificial intelligence (AI) and scientific exchange among AI researchers, practitioners, scientists, and engineers in affiliated disciplines. 

Thanh Nguyen

3

SHORT BIO

Presentations

Beyond NaN: Resiliency of Optimization Layers in The Face of Infeasibility

Behavioral Learning in Security Games: Threat of Multi-Step Manipulative Attacks

When Can the Defender Effectively Deceive Attackers in Security Games?

Stay up to date with the latest Underline news!

PRESENTATIONS

CONFERENCES

COMPANY

RESOURCES