Community health workers (CHWs) play a crucial role in
the last mile delivery of essential health services to underserved
populations in low-income countries. Many nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) provide training and
support to enable CHWs to deliver health services to their
communities, with no charge to the recipients of the services.
This includes monetary compensation for the work that
CHWs perform, which is broken down into a series of well defined
tasks. In this work, we partner with a NGO D-Tree
International to design a fair monetary compensation scheme
for tasks performed by CHWs in the semi-autonomous region
of Zanzibar in Tanzania, Africa. In consultation with
stakeholders, we interpret fairness as the equal opportunity
to earn, which means that each CHW has the opportunity to
earn roughly the same total payment over a given T month
period, if the CHW reacts to the incentive scheme almost rationally.
We model this problem as a reward design problem
for a Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulation for the
CHWs’ earning. There is a need for the mechanism to be
simple so that it is understood by the CHWs, thus, we explore
linear and piecewise linear rewards in the CHWs’ measured
units of work. We solve this design problem via a novel
policy-reward gradient result. Our experiments using two real
world parameters from the ground provide evidence of reasonable
incentive output by our scheme.

A Fair Incentive Scheme for Community Health Workers

Prior work has successfully incorporated optimization layers as the last layer in neural networks for various problems, thereby allowing joint learning and planning in one neural network forward pass. In this work, we identify a weakness in such a set-up where inputs to the optimization layer lead to undefined output of the neural network. Such undefined decision outputs can lead to possible catastrophic outcomes in critical real time applications. We show that an adversary can cause such failures by forcing rank deficiency on the matrix fed to the optimization layer which results in the optimization failing to produce a solution. We provide a defense for the failure cases by controlling the condition number of the input matrix. We study the problem in the settings of synthetic data, Jigsaw Sudoku, and in speed planning for autonomous driving. We show that our proposed defense effectively prevents the framework from failing with undefined output. Finally, we surface a number of edge cases which lead to serious bugs in popular optimization solvers which can be abused as well.

Beyond NaN: Resiliency of Optimization Layers in The Face of Infeasibility

This paper studies the problem of multi-step manipulative attacks in Stackelberg security games, in which a clever attacker attempts to orchestrate its attacks over multiple time steps to mislead the defender's learning of the attacker's behavior. This attack manipulation eventually influences the defender's patrol strategy towards the attacker's benefit. Previous work along this line of research only focuses on one-shot games in which the defender learns the attacker's behavior and then designs a corresponding strategy only once. Our work, on the other hand, investigates the long-term impact of the attacker's manipulation in which current attack and defense choices of players determine the future learning and patrol planning of the defender. This paper has three key contributions. First, we introduce a new multi-step manipulative attack game model that captures the impact of sequential manipulative attacks carried out by the attacker over the entire time horizon. Second, we propose a new algorithm to compute an optimal manipulative attack plan for the attacker, which tackles the challenge of multiple connected optimization components involved in the computation across multiple time steps. Finally, we present extensive experimental results on the impact of such misleading attacks, showing a significant benefit for the attacker and loss for the defender.  

Behavioral Learning in Security Games: Threat of Multi-Step Manipulative Attacks

Vaccine delivery in under-resourced locations with security
risks is not just challenging but also life threatening. The
COVID pandemic and the need to vaccinate added even more
urgency to this issue. Motivated by this problem, we propose
a general framework to set-up limited temporary (vaccination)
centers that balance physical security and desired (vaccine)
service coverage with limited resources. We set-up the
problem as a Stackelberg game between the centers operator
(defender) and an adversary, where the set of centers is not
fixed a priori but is part of the decision output. This results in
a mixed combinatorial and continuous optimization problem.
As part of our scalable approximation solution, we provide a
fundamental contribution by identifying general duality conditions
of switching max and min when both discrete and continuous
variables are involved. Via detailed experiments, we
show that the solution proposed is scalable in practice.

Securing Lifelines: Safe Delivery of Critical Services in Areas with Volatile Security Situation via a Stackelberg Game Approach

AISI: Public Health and Well-being

poster

The purpose of the AAAI conference series is to promote research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and foster scientific exchange between researchers, practitioners, scientists, students, and engineers across the entirety of AI and its affiliated disciplines. AAAI-23 is the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. The theme of this conference is to create collaborative bridges within and beyond AI. Like previous AAAI conferences, AAAI-23 will feature technical paper presentations, special tracks, invited speakers, workshops, tutorials, poster sessions, senior member presentations, competitions, and exhibit programs, and two new activities: a Bridge Program and a Lab Program. Many of these activities are tailored to the theme of bridges and all are selected according to the highest standards, with additional programs for students and young researchers. 
AAAI is providing you with a conference planner, which you can use to help organize your itinerary of activities. This includes talks to attend in person, talks to attend remotely, breaks with colleagues and your site seeing activities. To access this conference planner, please go to [https://aaai-2023.takemobi.io](https://aaai-2023.takemobi.io).

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AAAI 2023

The purpose of the AAAI conference series is to promote research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and foster scientific exchange between researchers, practitioners, scientists, students, and engineers across the entirety of AI and its affiliated disciplines.

Arunesh Sinha

4

SHORT BIO

Presentations

A Fair Incentive Scheme for Community Health Workers

Beyond NaN: Resiliency of Optimization Layers in The Face of Infeasibility

Behavioral Learning in Security Games: Threat of Multi-Step Manipulative Attacks

Securing Lifelines: Safe Delivery of Critical Services in Areas with Volatile Security Situation via a Stackelberg Game Approach

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