How responsible someone is for an outcome depends on both the causal role of their actions, and what those actions reveal about their moral character. Prior work has successfully modeled people's causal attributions and mental state inferences using planning algorithms assumed to approximate people's intuitive theory of mind about others' behavior. In this paper, we develop a unified computational framework for responsibility judgments in which the same generative planner can model both of these processes. We test our framework on a variety of animated social scenarios in two experiments. Experiment 1 features simple cases of helping and hindering. Experiment 2 features more complex interactions that require recursive reasoning, including cases where one agent affects another by merely signaling their intentions without physically acting on the world. Our model accurately captures participants' counterfactual simulations and intention inferences. Together, these two factors explain responsibility judgments.

A computational framework for responsibility judgments from counterfactual simulations and intention inferences

What shape do people's mental models take? We hypothesize that people build causal models that are suited to the task at hand. These models abstract away information to represent what matters. To test this idea empirically, we presented participants with causal learning paradigms where some features were outcome-relevant and others weren't. In Experiment 1, participants had to learn what objects of different shape and color made a machine turn on. In Experiment 2, they had to predict whether blocks sliding down ramps would cross a finish line. In both experiments, participants made systematic errors in a surprise test that asked them to recall what they had seen earlier. The errors people made suggest that they had build mental models of the task that privileged causally relevant information. Our results contribute to recent efforts trying to characterize the important role that causal abstraction plays in human learning and inference.


Learning what matters: Causal abstraction in human inference

How do essentialist beliefs about categories arise? We hypothesize that such beliefs are transmitted via language. We subject large language models (LLMs) to vignettes from the literature on essentialist categorization and find that they align well with people when the studies manipulated teleological information – information about what something is for. We examine whether in a classic test of essentialist categorization – the transformation task – LLMs prioritize teleological properties over information about what something looks like, or is made of. Experiments 1 and 2 find that telos and what something is made of matter more than appearance. Experiment 3, manipulates all three factors and finds that what something is for matters more than what it’s made of. Overall, these studies suggest that language alone may be sufficient to give rise to essentialist beliefs, and that information about what something is for matters more.

You are what you’re for: Essentialist categorization in large language models

Humans have a remarkable ability to go beyond the observable. From seeing the current state of our shared kitchen, we can infer what happened and who did it. Prior work has shown how the physical state of the world licenses inferences about the causal history of events, and the agents that participated in these events. Here, we investigate a previously unstudied source of evidence about what happened: social evaluations. In our experiment, we present situations in which a group failed to optimally coordinate their actions. Participants learn how much each agent was blamed for the outcome, and their task is to make inferences about the situation, the agents' actions, as well as the agents' capabilities. We develop a computational model that accurately captures participants' inferences. The model assumes that people blame others by considering what they should have done, and what causal role their action played. By inverting this generative model of blame, people can figure out what happened.

Who went fishing? Inferences from social evaluations

Humans rely on multimodal information to make judgements about events occurring in their environment. Haptic feedback, in particular, is essential to how people learn about and manipulate the objects they use daily. While much work has investigated how visual and auditory information affect the perception of causal events, little has explored how causal judgments change with the addition of haptic feedback. To begin addressing this question, we ran a psychophysical study based on the Michottean launching paradigm. We compared the use of visual and haptic with solely visual information during causally ambiguous collisions. We manipulated the offset between when the first object stops moving and the second object starts moving. Using a custom one degree-of-freedom haptic device, users in the vision and haptic condition received kinesthetic haptic feedback synchronized to the second object’s motion. The results demonstrate that adding haptic information increases causal perception for events with larger temporal offsets.

In Touch with Causation: Understanding the Impact of Kinesthetic Haptics on Causality

When you see a glass fall off the table, you can predict it will break without seeing it hit the ground. Similarly, if you hear the glass shatter, you can infer what happened without seeing anything at all. Our knowledge of the causal mechanisms structuring our world allows us to make impressively accurate inferences based on incomplete information spread across multiple sensory modalities. In this work, we study the cognitive processing that supports this remarkable behavior. We utilize the Plinko domain, an intuitive physics setup where marbles are dropped into a box from one of three holes, colliding with obstacles as they fall to the ground. Participants judge where they think the ball fell from based on visual and auditory evidence. We track participants' eye-gaze to gain deeper insight into their mental processes, and develop models that characterize the computational processes underlying participant behavior.

Eye-Tracking Multi-Modal Inference

To hold someone responsible, we need to assess what causal role their action played in bringing about the outcome. Causality, in turn, can be understood in terms of difference-making -- C caused E if E would have been different had C been different. In previous work, the counterfactual of “C being different” is often construed as “C being absent”. Here, we explore how in social situations, this counterfactual can be alternatively construed by imagining how a different person would have acted in the same situation. We propose a computational model that formalizes this idea of counterfactual replacement. The model compares what actually happened with what would have happened had the person of interest been replaced by someone else, and then predicts responsibility to the extent that the replacement person would likely have changed the outcome. We test our model against people’s responsibility judgments in a variety of scenarios across several experiments.

The role of counterfactual reasoning in responsibility judgments

This work attempts to bridge the divide between accounts of causal reasoning with respect to agents and objects. We begin by examining the influence of animacy. In a collision-based context, we vary the animacy status of an object using 3D animations. By holding the fine-grained kinematics of the actual and counterfactual outcomes fixed across animate and inanimate conditions, we find that animacy, itself, has no effect on causal attribution judgments. Next, we test if causal judgments for animate and inanimate objects differ as a function of the counterfactuals they respectively afford in a disjunctive causal structure. Here, we find that the effect of perceived animacy on causal attribution is mediated by differences in counterfactual judgments. Finally, we introduce the known effect of prescriptive norm violations to this paradigm. Our findings collectively highlight how normative expectations specify the counterfactual considerations that guide causal reasoning for both agents and objects.

Causal Reasoning Across Agents and Objects

There are at least three ways of learning how the world works: learning from observations, from interventions, and from explanations. Prior work on causal inference focused on how people learn the underlying causal structure of a model through observation and intervention. Our study is the first to look at what people can learn from explanations in the context of a causal structure learning paradigm. We develop a normative inference model that learns from observations and explanations, and compare the model's predictions to participants' performance. The task is to infer the causal connections in 3-node graphs, based on information about their co-activation, and explanations of the kind "B activated because A activated". We find that participants learn better from explanations than from observations. However, while the normative model benefits from having observations in addition to explanations, participants did not.

Show and tell: Learning causal structures from observations and explanations

When choosing how to describe what happened, we have a number of causal verbs at our disposal. In this paper, we develop a model-theoretic formal semantics for nine causal verbs that span the categories of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT. Our model uses structural causal models (SCMs) to represent participants' mental construction of a scene when assessing the correctness of causal expressions within the presented context. Furthermore, SCMs enable us to model events relating both the physical world as well as agents' mental states. In experimental evaluations, we find that the proposed semantics exhibits a closer alignment with human evaluations in comparison to prior accounts of the verb families.

A Semantics for Causing, Enabling, and Preventing Verbs Grounded in Structural Causal Models

Poster Session 2

poster

The 45th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society will take place in Sydney, Australia as a modified hybrid conference. Presentations from the main-session room will be live-streamed every day for all events. This will include all invited talks and award sessions. Recordings of all CogSci 2023 sessions will be made available for on-demand viewing after the conference. 
The in-person component will be held at the International Convention Centre Sydney at Darling Harbour. The Conference will take place Wednesday July 26th – Saturday July 29th, 2023 (Wednesday, July 26th is the Workshops Day).

Join us!

 [**The Program at a Glance can be found here**](https://cognitivesciencesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/COgSci-PAAG-V2.pdf)
 [**The Detailed Program can be found here**](https://online.fliphtml5.com/ebtyf/mswz/)
 

#### **CogSci 2023 Program Book**
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CogSci 2023

The 45th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society presents the latest research across cognitive science and highlights the theme of Cognition in Context.

T.20: Causation 1

technical paper

Poster Session 1

**Session Chair: **Stephanie Denison 
**Technical Session Chair: **Tiffany Doan 
**Session Description: ** The session is comprised of 15 minute talks followed by up to 5 minutes of live Q&A time for each presenter.

IP30: Social cognition

### Looking for Cogsci 2023? Please [click here](https://underline.io/events/405/reception) to switch to 2023 edition.


**Dear Colleagues,**

Welcome to the 43rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society! 

This year’s conference brings together the latest research from all Cognitive Science and also highlights this year’s theme **Comparative Cognition: Animal Minds.** 

The program features four plenary speakers: Friederike Range (University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna), Onur Güntürkün (Ruhr University Bochum), Julia Fischer (University of Göttingen), and Erich Jarvis (The Rockefeller University). The keynotes and invited symposia showcase the broad spectrum of ideas that encompass the conference theme of comparative cognition. 

Further, the program includes the Rumelhart Prize keynote presentation by Susan Goldin-Meadow (University of Chicago), and symposia to celebrate the winner of the Elman Prize: Wei Ji Ma (New York University), the Heineken Award winner Robert Zatorre (McGill University), and the Robert J. Glushko Dissertation Prizes session.

The program committee for CogSci 2021 received 1,025 submissions, including 710 full papers, 275 member abstracts, 8 publication-based talks, as well as 15 proposals for symposia, and 17 for workshops and tutorials. After a rigorous review process, the committee selected 152 papers for oral presentation and inclusion in the conference proceedings (14.8%), 332 papers for poster presentation and inclusion in the proceedings (32.4%), and 175 papers for poster presentation with inclusion of abstracts in the proceedings (17.1%) We also selected 275 submitted member abstracts. In addition, we accepted 6 publication-based talks, 12 symposia, and 9 workshops and tutorials to make for an exciting and inclusive program.

We hope that you enjoy the conference this year! 

**Your Program Chairs,**
![](https://assets.underline.io/uploads/markdown_image/1/image/99984908caba5e6453e5fc5ba34f3507.jpg)

**Learn more about the Vienna Cognitive Science Hub at the University of Vienna, hosts of CogSci 2021**

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To review the proceedings for the conference or review the searchable program, please visit the [website](https://cognitivesciencesociety.org/program/).

CogSci 2021

The Cognitive Science Society brings together researchers from around the world who hold a common goal: understanding the nature of the human mind. The mission of the Society is to promote Cognitive Science as a discipline, and to foster scientific interchange among researchers in various areas of study, including Artificial Intelligence, Linguistics, Anthropology, Psychology, Neuroscience, Philosophy, and Education. The Society is a non-profit professional organization and its activities include sponsoring an annual conference and publishing the journals Cognitive Science and TopiCS.


**For a full list of posters in this session, click the See All link on the right side of the page.**

Poster Session 1 -  C : Cognitive Science

Poster Session 2 -  F: Neuroscience

Poster Session 3 -  C : Cognitive Science

This session has no scheduled virtual poster presentation time, but attendees will be able to comment and ask questions about your work/research asynchronously throughout the conference. 

**If you are a virtual poster presenter**, you can leave a message in your poster area chat space to advise times (and time zone) that you will be available either in the chat box, or by setting up your own online meeting room (Zoom, etc.). 
**If you are an attendee**, please check each poster's chat box and arrange time with presenter.

Tobias Gerstenberg

10

2

Presentations

A computational framework for responsibility judgments from counterfactual simulations and intention inferences

Learning what matters: Causal abstraction in human inference

You are what you’re for: Essentialist categorization in large language models

Who went fishing? Inferences from social evaluations

In Touch with Causation: Understanding the Impact of Kinesthetic Haptics on Causality

Eye-Tracking Multi-Modal Inference

The role of counterfactual reasoning in responsibility judgments

Causal Reasoning Across Agents and Objects

Show and tell: Learning causal structures from observations and explanations

A Semantics for Causing, Enabling, and Preventing Verbs Grounded in Structural Causal Models

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