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The facility location game is an extensively studied problem in mechanism design. In the classical model, the cost of each agent is her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we consider a novel model where each facility charges an entrance fee, which is a function of the facility&#39;s location. Thus, in our model, the cost of each agent is the sum of the distance to the facility and the entrance fee of the facility. The generalized model captures more real-life scenarios. In our model, the entrance fee function can be an arbitrary function, and the corresponding preferences of agents may not be single-peaked anymore: this makes the problem complex and requires new techniques in the analysis. We systematically study the model and design strategyproof mechanisms with nice approximation ratios and also complement these with nearly-tight impossibility results. Specifically, for one-facility and two-facility games, we provide upper and lower bounds for the approximation ratios given by deterministic and randomized mechanisms, with respect to the utilitarian and egalitarian objectives. Most of our bounds are tight, and these bounds are independent of the entrance fee functions. Our results also match the results of the classical model.

AAAI 2023

Facility Location Games with Entrance Fees

approximation ratio

strategyrproof

entrance fees

facility location games

ECAI2020 featured a full programme of technical papers, as well as many AI-related events of interest for researchers, students and all attendants who are interested on contemporary AI, including:




**An extensive programme of workshops, tutorials, and invited speakers**

**The Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems conference (PAIS)**

**The Frontiers in AI track sessions**

**The Lab To Market event**

**The Women in AI time**

**The EU Challenges forum**

… and many more!

ECAI 2020

ECAI 2020 featured a full programme of technical papers, as well as many AI-related events of interest for researchers, students and all attendants who are interested on contemporary AI.

The facility location game is an extensively studied problem in mechanism design. In the classical model, the cost of each agent is her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we consider a novel model where each facility charges an entrance fee, which is a function of the facility's location. Thus, in our model, the cost of each agent is the sum of the distance to the facility and the entrance fee of the facility. The generalized model captures more real-life scenarios. In our model, the entrance fee function can be an arbitrary function, and the corresponding preferences of agents may not be single-peaked anymore: this makes the problem complex and requires new techniques in the analysis. We systematically study the model and design strategyproof mechanisms with nice approximation ratios and also complement these with nearly-tight impossibility results. Specifically, for one-facility and two-facility games, we provide upper and lower bounds for the approximation ratios given by deterministic and randomized mechanisms, with respect to the utilitarian and egalitarian objectives. Most of our bounds are tight, and these bounds are independent of the entrance fee functions. Our results also match the results of the classical model.

poster

The purpose of the AAAI conference series is to promote research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and foster scientific exchange between researchers, practitioners, scientists, students, and engineers across the entirety of AI and its affiliated disciplines. AAAI-23 is the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. The theme of this conference is to create collaborative bridges within and beyond AI. Like previous AAAI conferences, AAAI-23 will feature technical paper presentations, special tracks, invited speakers, workshops, tutorials, poster sessions, senior member presentations, competitions, and exhibit programs, and two new activities: a Bridge Program and a Lab Program. Many of these activities are tailored to the theme of bridges and all are selected according to the highest standards, with additional programs for students and young researchers. 
AAAI is providing you with a conference planner, which you can use to help organize your itinerary of activities. This includes talks to attend in person, talks to attend remotely, breaks with colleagues and your site seeing activities. To access this conference planner, please go to [https://aaai-2023.takemobi.io](https://aaai-2023.takemobi.io).

In order to access this site, you need to register. If you haven't already, please register [here](https://aaai.org/Conferences/AAAI-23/registration/).


The purpose of the AAAI conference series is to promote research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and foster scientific exchange between researchers, practitioners, scientists, students, and engineers across the entirety of AI and its affiliated disciplines.

This paper explores reward mechanisms for a query incentive network in which agents seek information from social networks. In a query tree issued by the task owner, each agent is rewarded by the owner for contributing to the solution, for instance, solving the task or inviting others to solve it. The reward mechanism determines the reward for each agent and motivates all agents to propagate and report their information truthfully. In particular, the reward cannot exceed the budget set by the task owner. However, our impossibility results demonstrate that a reward mechanism cannot simultaneously achieve Sybil-proof (agents benefit from manipulating multiple fake identities), collusion-proof (multiple agents pretend as a single agent to improve the reward), and other essential properties. In order to address these issues, we propose two novel reward mechanisms. The first mechanism achieves Sybil-proof and collusion-proof, respectively; the second mechanism sacrifices Sybil-proof to achieve the approximate versions of Sybil-proof and collusion-proof. Additionally, we show experimentally that our second reward mechanism outperforms the existing ones.

Collusion-proof And Sybil-proof Reward Mechanisms For Query Incentive Networks

The last decades are marked by massive and diverse image data, which shows increasingly high resolution and quality. However, some images we obtained may be corrupted, affecting the perception and the application of downstream tasks. A generic method for generating a high-quality image from the degraded one is in demand. In this paper, we present a novel GAN inversion framework that utilizes the powerful generative ability of StyleGAN-XL for this problem. To ease the inversion challenge with StyleGAN-XL, Clustering \& Regularize Inversion (CRI) is proposed. Specifically, the latent space is firstly divided into finer-grained sub-spaces by clustering. Instead of initializing the inversion with the average latent vector, we approximate a centroid latent vector from the clusters, which generates an image close to the input image. Then, an offset with a regularization term is introduced to keep the inverted latent vector within a certain range. We validate our CRI scheme on multiple restoration tasks (i.e., inpainting, colorization, and super-resolution) of complex natural images, and show preferable quantitative and qualitative results. We further demonstrate our technique is robust in terms of data and different GAN models. To our best knowledge, we are the first to adopt StyleGAN-XL for generating high-quality natural images from diverse degraded inputs. Code is available at https://github.com/Booooooooooo/CRI.

High-Resolution GAN Inversion for Degraded Images in Large Diverse Datasets

In the field of parameterized complexity theory, the study of graph width measures has been intimately connected with the development of width-based model checking algorithms for combinatorial properties on graphs. In this work, we introduce a general framework to convert a large class of width-based model-checking algorithms into algorithms that can be used to test the validity of graph-theoretic conjectures
on classes of graphs of bounded width. Our framework is modular and can be applied with respect to several well-studied width measures for graphs, including treewidth and cliquewidth. 

As a quantitative application of our framework, we prove analytically that for several long-standing graph-theoretic conjectures, there exists an algorithm that takes a number $k$ as input and correctly determines in time double-exponential in $k^O(1)$ whether the conjecture is valid on all graphs of treewidth at most $k$. These upper bounds, which may be regarded as upper-bounds on the size of proofs/disproofs for these conjectures on the class of graphs of treewidth at most $k$, improve significantly on theoretical upper bounds obtained using previously available techniques.

From Width-Based Model Checking to Width-Based Automated Theorem Proving

We consider the problem of large-scale Fisher market equilibrium computation through scalable first-order optimization methods. It is well-known that market equilibria can be captured using structured convex programs such as the Eisenberg-Gale and Shmyrev convex programs. Highly performant deterministic full-gradient first-order methods have been developed for these programs. In this paper, we develop new block-coordinate first-order methods for computing Fisher market equilibria, and show that these methods have interpretations as tâtonnement-style or proportional response-style dynamics where either buyers or items show up one at a time. We reformulate these convex programs and solve them using proximal block coordinate descent methods, a class of methods that update only a small number of coordinates of the decision variable in each iteration. Leveraging recent advances in the convergence analysis of these methods and structures of the equilibrium-capturing convex programs, we establish fast convergence rates of these methods. 

Fast and Interpretable Dynamics for Fisher Markets via Block-Coordinate Updates

Persona-based dialogue systems aim to generate consistent responses based on historical context and predefined persona. Unlike conventional dialogue generation, the persona-based dialogue needs to consider both dialogue context and persona, posing a challenge for coherent training. Specifically, this requires a delicate weight balance between context and persona. To achieve that, in this paper, we propose an effective framework with Persona-Adaptive Attention (PAA), which adaptively integrates the weights from the persona and context information via our designed attention. In addition, a dynamic masking mechanism is applied to the PAA to not only drop redundant information in context and persona but also serve as a regularization mechanism to avoid overfitting. Experimental results demonstrate the superiority of the proposed PAA framework compared to the strong baselines in both automatic and human evaluation. Moreover, the proposed PAA approach can perform equivalently well in a low-resource regime compared to models trained in a full-data setting, which achieve a similar result with only 20% to 30% of data compared to the larger models trained in the full-data setting. To fully exploit the effectiveness of our design, we designed several variants for handling the weighted information in different ways, showing the necessity and sufficiency of our weighting and masking designs. 

Personalized Dialogue Generation with Persona-Adaptive Attention

Epistemic logics typically talk about knowledge of individual agents or groups of explicitly listed agents. Often, however, one wishes to express knowledge of groups of agents specified by a given property, as in ‘it is common knowledge among economists’. We introduce such a logic of common knowledge, which we term abstract-group epistemic logic (AGEL). That is, AGEL features a common knowledge operator for groups of agents given by concepts in a separate agent logic that we keep generic, with one possible agent logic being ALC. We show that AGEL is EXPTIME-complete, with the lower bound established by reduction from standard group epistemic logic, and the upper bound by a satisfiability-preserving embedding into the full µ-calculus. Further main results include a finite model property (not enjoyed by the full µ-calculus) and a complete axiomatization.

Common Knowledge of Abstract Groups

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are powerful tools for graph representation learning. Despite their rapid development, GNNs also face some challenges, such as over-fitting, over-smoothing, and non-robustness. Previous works indicate that these problems can be alleviated by random dropping methods, which integrate augmented data into models by randomly masking parts of the input. However, some open problems of random dropping on GNNs remain to be solved. First, it is challenging to find a universal method that are suitable for all cases considering the divergence of different datasets and models. Second, augmented data introduced to GNNs causes the incomplete coverage of parameters and unstable training process. Third, there is no theoretical analysis on the effectiveness of random dropping methods on GNNs. In this paper, we propose a novel random dropping method called DropMessage, which performs dropping operations directly on the propagated messages during the message-passing process. More importantly, we find that DropMessage provides a unified framework for most existing random dropping methods, based on which we give theoretical analysis of their effectiveness. Furthermore, we elaborate the superiority of DropMessage: it stabilizes the training process by reducing sample variance; it keeps information diversity from the perspective of information theory, enabling it become a theoretical upper bound of other methods. To evaluate our proposed method, we conduct experiments that aims for multiple tasks on five public datasets and two industrial datasets with various backbone models. The experimental results show that DropMessage has the advantages of both effectiveness and generalization, and can significantly alleviate the problems mentioned above. A detailed version with full appendix can be found on arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.10037.

DropMessage: Unifying Random Dropping for Graph Neural Networks

Modern social networks are dynamic in their nature; new connections are appearing, and old connections are disappearing all the time. However, in our algorithmic and complexity studies, we usually model social networks as static graphs.

In this paper, we propose a new paradigm for the study of the well-known Target Set Selection problem, which is a fundamental problem in viral marketing and the spread of opinion through social networks. In particular, we use temporal graphs to capture the dynamic nature of social networks.

We show that the temporal interpretation is, unsurprisingly, NP-complete in general. Then, we study the computational complexity of this problem for multiple restrictions of both the threshold function and the underlying graph structure and provide multiple hardness lower bounds.

Maximizing Influence Spread through a Dynamic Social Network

Conversational Systems (CSys) represent practical and tangible outcomes of advances in NLP and AI. CSys see continuous improvements through unsupervised training of large language models (LLMs) on a humongous amount of generic training data. However, when these CSys are suggested for use in domains like Mental Health, they fail to match the acceptable standards of clinical care, such as the clinical process in Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9). The talk will present, Knowledge-infused Learning (KiL), a paradigm within NeuroSymbolic AI that focuses on making machine/deep learning models (i) learn over knowledge-enriched data, (ii) learn to follow guidelines in process-oriented tasks for safe and reasonable genera-
tion, and (iii) learn to leverage multiple contexts and stratified knowledge to yield user-level explanations. KiL established Knowledge-Intensive Language Understanding, a set of tasks for assessing safety, explainability, and conceptual flow in CSys.

Targeted Knowledge Infusion To Make Conversational AI Explainable and Safe

A hallmark of human intelligence is that we continue to learn new information and then extrapolate the learned information onto new tasks and domains (Thrun and Pratt (1998)). While this is a fairly intuitive observation, formulating such ideas has proved to be a challenging research problem and continues to inspire new studies. Recently, there has been increasing interest in AI/ML about building models that generalize across tasks, even when they have some form of distribution shifts. How can we ground this research in a solid framework to develop principled methods for better practice? This talk will present my recent works addressing this research question, including understanding information transfer in multitask learning, identifying negative transfers in multitask learning using surrogate models, and positive and negative generalizations in data augmentation.

Facility Location Games with Entrance Fees

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Collusion-proof And Sybil-proof Reward Mechanisms For Query Incentive Networks

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