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Collecting new information about the outside world is a key aspect of brain function. In the context of vision, we move our eyes multiple times per second to accumulate evidence about a scene. Prior studies have suggested that this process is goal-directed and close to optimal. Here, we show that this process of seeking new information suffers from a confirmation bias similar to what has been observed in a wide range of other contexts. We present data from a new gaze-contingent task that allows us to both estimate a participant&#39;s current belief, and compare that to their subsequent eye-movements. We find that these eye-movements are biased in a confirmatory way. Finally, we show that these empirical results can be parsimoniously explained under the assumption that the brain performs approximate, not exact, inference, with computations being more approximate in decision-making compared to sensory areas.

CogSci 2021

A confirmation bias due to approximate active inference

### Looking for Cogsci 2023? Please [click here](https://underline.io/events/405/reception) to switch to 2023 edition.


**Dear Colleagues,**

Welcome to the 43rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society! 

This year’s conference brings together the latest research from all Cognitive Science and also highlights this year’s theme **Comparative Cognition: Animal Minds.** 

The program features four plenary speakers: Friederike Range (University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna), Onur Güntürkün (Ruhr University Bochum), Julia Fischer (University of Göttingen), and Erich Jarvis (The Rockefeller University). The keynotes and invited symposia showcase the broad spectrum of ideas that encompass the conference theme of comparative cognition. 

Further, the program includes the Rumelhart Prize keynote presentation by Susan Goldin-Meadow (University of Chicago), and symposia to celebrate the winner of the Elman Prize: Wei Ji Ma (New York University), the Heineken Award winner Robert Zatorre (McGill University), and the Robert J. Glushko Dissertation Prizes session.

The program committee for CogSci 2021 received 1,025 submissions, including 710 full papers, 275 member abstracts, 8 publication-based talks, as well as 15 proposals for symposia, and 17 for workshops and tutorials. After a rigorous review process, the committee selected 152 papers for oral presentation and inclusion in the conference proceedings (14.8%), 332 papers for poster presentation and inclusion in the proceedings (32.4%), and 175 papers for poster presentation with inclusion of abstracts in the proceedings (17.1%) We also selected 275 submitted member abstracts. In addition, we accepted 6 publication-based talks, 12 symposia, and 9 workshops and tutorials to make for an exciting and inclusive program.

We hope that you enjoy the conference this year!<br><br>

**Your Program Chairs,**
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**Learn more about the Vienna Cognitive Science Hub at the University of Vienna, hosts of CogSci 2021**

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To review the proceedings for the conference or review the searchable program, please visit the [website](https://cognitivesciencesociety.org/program/).


The Cognitive Science Society brings together researchers from around the world who hold a common goal: understanding the nature of the human mind. The mission of the Society is to promote Cognitive Science as a discipline, and to foster scientific interchange among researchers in various areas of study, including Artificial Intelligence, Linguistics, Anthropology, Psychology, Neuroscience, Philosophy, and Education. The Society is a non-profit professional organization and its activities include sponsoring an annual conference and publishing the journals Cognitive Science and TopiCS.

The AGI conference series is the only major conference series devoted wholly and specifically to the creation of AI systems possessing general intelligence at the human level and ultimately beyond. By gathering together active researchers in the field, for presentation of results and discussion of ideas, we accelerate our progress toward our common goal.

Underline hosted the two main days of AGI 2020 on Wednesday June 24th and Thursday June 25th. Both days were **live-streamed** and you can read the full program bellow. All presentations are available for a **asynchronous viewing**. All presenters are grouped into panels. You can also hear guest talks by **Ben Goertzel** (SingularityNET), **Valery Tarasov** (Semenov Institute of Chemical Physics), **Tatiana Shavrina** (Sberbank) and **Joscha Bach** (MIT Media Lab). 

AGI-20

The AGI conference series is the only major conference series devoted wholly and specifically to the creation of AI systems possessing general intelligence at the human level and ultimately beyond. By gathering together active researchers in the field, for presentation of results and discussion of ideas, we accelerate our progress toward our common goal.

Collecting new information about the outside world is a key aspect of brain function. In the context of vision, we move our eyes multiple times per second to accumulate evidence about a scene. Prior studies have suggested that this process is goal-directed and close to optimal. Here, we show that this process of seeking new information suffers from a confirmation bias similar to what has been observed in a wide range of other contexts. We present data from a new gaze-contingent task that allows us to both estimate a participant's current belief, and compare that to their subsequent eye-movements. We find that these eye-movements are biased in a confirmatory way. Finally, we show that these empirical results can be parsimoniously explained under the assumption that the brain performs approximate, not exact, inference, with computations being more approximate in decision-making compared to sensory areas.

technical paper

Perceiving 3D structure in natural images is an immense computational challenge for the visual system. While many previous studies focused on rigid 3D objects, we applied a novel method on a common set of non-rigid objects—static images of the human body in the natural world. We investigated to what extent human ability to interpret 3D poses in natural images depends on pose typicality and viewpoint informativeness. We tested subjects on matching natural pose images with synthetic body images of the same poses given viewpoint changes. We found that performance for typical poses was measurably better than atypical poses; however, we found no significant difference between informative and less informative viewpoints. Results suggested that human ability to interpret 3D poses depends on pose typicality but not viewpoint informativeness. Further comparisons of 2D and 3D pose matching models suggested that humans probably use prior knowledge of 3D pose structures.

Three-dimensional pose discrimination in natural images of humans

Building on research arguing for the possibility of conceptual and categorical knowledge acquisition through statistics contained in language, we evaluate predictive language models (LMs)---informed solely by textual input---on a prevalent phenomenon in cognitive science: typicality. Inspired by experiments that involve language processing and show robust typicality effects in humans, we propose two tests for LMs. Our first test targets whether typicality modulates LM probabilities in assigning taxonomic category memberships to items. The second test investigates sensitivities to typicality in LMs' probabilities when extending new information about items to their categories. Both tests show modest---but not completely absent---correspondence between LMs and humans, suggesting that text-based exposure alone is insufficient to acquire typicality knowledge.

Do language models learn typicality judgments from text?

Two assumptions of psycholinguistic research are that text corpora can be used as a proxy of the language that people have been exposed to and that the reaction time with which people recognize words decreases with the probability (or frequency) of the words in a corpus. We propose a method that produces topic-specific word probabilities from a text corpus using latent Dirichlet allocation, then combines them to fit lexical decision reaction times and re-estimates word probabilities. We evaluated how well independent lexical decision reaction times could be predicted from re-estimated word probabilities compared to original probabilities, using independent lexical decision data. In an experiment designed to prove the concept, the re-estimated word frequency model explained up to 9.6% of additional variability in reaction times on group level and up to 2.9% on level of individual participants.

Word Probability Re-Estimation Using Topic Modeling and Lexical Decision Data

Improving the accuracy of medical image interpretation is critical to improving the diagnosis of many diseases. Using both novices (undergraduates) and experts (medical professionals), we investigate methods for improving the accuracy of a single decision maker by aggregating repeated decisions from an individual in different ways. Our participants made classification decisions (cancerous versus non-cancerous) and confidence judgments on a series of cell images, viewing and classifying each image twice. We first applied the maximum confidence slating algorithm (Koriat, 2012), which leverages metacognitive ability by using the most confident response for an image as the `final response'. We also examined algorithms that aggregated decisions based on image similarity, leveraging neural network models to determine similarity. We found maximum confidence slating improves classification accuracy for both novices and experts. However, aggregating responses on similar images improves classification accuracy for novices and not experts, suggesting differences in the decision mechanisms of novices and experts.

Improving Medical Image Decision Making by Leveraging Metacognitive Processes and Representational Similarity

Traditional statistics instruction emphasizes a .05 significance level for hypothesis tests. Here, we investigate the consequences of this training for researchers’ mental representations of probabilities –– whether .05 becomes a boundary, i.e., a discontinuity of the mental number line, and alters their perception of differences between p-values. Graduate students (n = 25) with statistical training viewed pairs of p-values and judged whether they were ‘similar’ or ‘different’. After controlling for covariates, participants were more likely and faster to judge p-values as ‘different’ when they crossed the .05 boundary (e.g., .047 vs. .052) compared to when they did not (e.g., .027 vs. .032). This categorical perception effect suggests that traditional statistical instruction creates a psychologically real divide between so-called statistically significant and non-significant p-values. Such a distortion is undesirable given modern approaches to statistical reasoning that de-emphasize dichotomizing p-values.

Categorical perception of p-values

Estimating parameters of cognitive models is crucial to be able to accurately describe cognitive processing of individuals, under varying circumstances. To ensure that individual parameter estimates represent individual cognitive processes, it is important to consider model identification and specific influence. Model identification refers to whether a unique set of parameter estimates is associated with a particular pattern in the data; Specific influence means that certain experimental manipulations affect only specific cognitive processes, reflected in changes in only those parameters that represent those processes, and not others. These two general concepts also apply to cognitive models of more applied tasks and settings, such as driving. In the current work, we specifically test whether these two requirements hold in a commonly used cognitive model of visual control of steering behavior. For this model, we test the identifiability, and then estimate parameters of two experiments to understand how cognitive load and driving speed specifically influence parameter estimates of the model. The results indicate that the two-point visual control of steering model is identified, and that cognitive load and driving speed are related to different parameters.

Identifiability and Specificity of the Two-Point Visual Control Model of Steering

Studies on similarity-based interference in subject-verb number agreement dependencies have found a consistent facilitatory effect in ungrammatical sentences but no conclusive effect in grammatical sentences. Existing models propose that interference is caused either by a faulty representation of the input (encoding-based models) or by difficulty in retrieving the subject based on cues at the verb (retrieval-based models). Neither class of model captures the observed patterns in human reading time data. We propose a new model that integrates a feature encoding mechanism into an existing cue-based retrieval model. Our model outperforms the cue-based retrieval model in explaining interference effect data from both grammatical and ungrammatical sentences. These modeling results yield a new insight into sentence processing, encoding modulates retrieval. Nouns stored in memory undergo feature distortion, which in turn affects how retrieval unfolds during dependency completion.

Feature encoding modulates cue-based retrieval: Modeling interference effects in both grammatical and ungrammatical sentences

Snoddy and Kurtz (2020) demonstrated spontaneous transfer of relational categories to new learning. Recognition memory data suggested that transfer was driven by schematization during learning. In the present study, we explored whether schema abstraction underlies transfer and recognition effects. Participants were assigned to condition based on the type of initial learning: classification with comparison, supervised observation with comparison, single-item supervised observation, or baseline (no learning). After initial learning, participants underwent a study phase and recognition test on novel stimuli followed by a target category learning task involving the same underlying category structures expressed in a new domain. During the recognition test, all conditions led to increased false alarms relative to baseline. Only the comparison conditions exhibited analogical transfer on the target category learning task. Results suggest that comparison facilitates the transfer of relational categories (due to schema abstraction), but recognition memory effects may be driven by more general categorization mechanisms.

Comparison Promotes the Spontaneous Transfer of Relational Categories

How people represent categories—and how those representations change over time—is a basic question about human cognition. Previous research has suggested that people categorize objects by comparing them to category prototypes in early stages of learning but use strategies that consider the individual exemplars within each category in later stages. However, many category learning experiments do not accurately reflect the environmental statistics of the real world, where the probability that we encounter an object changes over time. Our goal in this study was to introduce memory constraints by presenting each stimulus at intervals corresponding to the power-law function of memory decay. Since the exemplar model relies on the individual’s ability to store and retrieve previously seen exemplars, we hypothesized that adding memory constraints that better reflect real environments would favor the exemplar model more early on compared with later. Confirming our hypothesis, the results illustrate that under realistic environmental statistics with memory constraints, the exemplar model’s advantage over the the prototype model decreases over time.

The Dynamics of Exemplar and Prototype Representations Depend on Environmental Statistics

Computational model simulations have been very fruitful for gaining insight into how the systematic structure we observe in the world's natural languages could have emerged through cultural evolution. However, these model simulations operate on a toy scale compared to the size of actual human vocabularies, due to the prohibitive computational resource demands that simulations with larger lexicons would pose. Using computational complexity analysis, we show that this is not an implementational artifact, but instead it reflects a deeper theoretical issue: these models are (in their current formulation) computationally intractable. This has important theoretical implications, because it means that there is no way of knowing whether or not the properties and regularities observed for the toy models would scale up. All is not lost however, because awareness of intractability allows us to face the issue of scaling head-on, and can guide the development of our theories.

A confirmation bias due to approximate active inference

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A confirmation bias due to approximate active inference

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Three-dimensional pose discrimination in natural images of humans

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Cognitive Machinery and Behaviours

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