VIDEO DOI: https://doi.org/10.48448/6g68-nq87
PAPER DOI: Two-sided auctions; Mechanism design; Fairness; Budget feasibility

technical paper

AAMAS 2020

May 11, 2020

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Two-sided Auctions with Budgets: Fairness, Incentives and Efficiency

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