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A set of players delegate playing a game to a set of representatives, one for each player. We imagine that each player trusts their respective representative&#39;s strategic abilities. Thus, we might imagine that per default, the original players would simply instruct the representatives to play the original game as best as they can. In this paper, we ask: are there safe Pareto improvements on this default way of giving instructions? That is, we imagine that the original players can coordinate to tell their representatives to only consider some subset of the available strategies and to assign utilities to outcomes differently than the original players. Then can the original players do this in such a way that the payoff is guaranteed to be weakly higher than under the default instructions for all the original players? In particular, can they Pareto-improve without probabilistic assumptions about how the representatives play games? In this paper, we give some examples of safe Pareto improvements. We prove that the notion of safe Pareto improvements is closely related to a notion of outcome correspondence between games. We also show that under some specific assumptions about how the representatives play games, finding safe Pareto improvements is NP-complete.

AAMAS 2021

Safe Pareto Improvements for Delegated Game Playing

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A set of players delegate playing a game to a set of representatives, one for each player. We imagine that each player trusts their respective representative's strategic abilities. Thus, we might imagine that per default, the original players would simply instruct the representatives to play the original game as best as they can. In this paper, we ask: are there safe Pareto improvements on this default way of giving instructions? That is, we imagine that the original players can coordinate to tell their representatives to only consider some subset of the available strategies and to assign utilities to outcomes differently than the original players. Then can the original players do this in such a way that the payoff is guaranteed to be weakly higher than under the default instructions for all the original players? In particular, can they Pareto-improve without probabilistic assumptions about how the representatives play games? In this paper, we give some examples of safe Pareto improvements. We prove that the notion of safe Pareto improvements is closely related to a notion of outcome correspondence between games. We also show that under some specific assumptions about how the representatives play games, finding safe Pareto improvements is NP-complete.

technical paper

Strategic diversity is often essential in games: in multi-player games, for example, evaluating a player against a diverse set of strategies will yield a more accurate estimate of its performance. Furthermore, in games with non-transitivities diversity allows a player to cover several winning strategies. However, despite the significance of strategic diversity, training agents that exhibit diverse behaviour remains a challenge. In this paper we study how to construct diverse populations of agents by carefully structuring how individuals within a population interact. Our approach is based on interaction graphs, which control the flow of information between agents during training and can encourage agents to specialise on different strategies, leading to improved overall performance. We provide evidence for the importance of diversity in multi-agent training and analyse the effect of applying different interaction graphs on the training trajectories, diversity and performance of populations in a range of games.

Pick Your Battles: Interaction Graphs as Population-Level Objectives for Strategic Diversity

Distributed multi-agent learning enables agents to cooperatively train a model without requiring to share their datasets. While this setting ensures some level of privacy, it has been shown that, even when data is not directly shared, the training process is vulnerable to privacy attacks including data reconstruction and model inversion attacks. Additionally, malicious agents that train on inverted labels or random data, may arbitrarily weaken the accuracy of the global model. This paper addresses these challenges and presents Privacy-preserving and Accountable Distributed Learning (PA-DL), a fully decentralized framework that relies on Differential Privacy to guarantee strong privacy protection of the agents data, and Ethereum smart contracts to ensure accountability.

Privacy-Preserving and Accountable Multi-agent Learning

Competitive Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are inherently hard to control due to agent autonomy and strategic behavior, which is particularly problematic when there are system-level objectives to be achieved or specific environmental states to be avoided.

Toward a Self-Learning Governance Loop for Competitive Multi-Attribute MAS

Efficient communication is a promising way to achieve cooperation among agents in many real-world scenarios. However, aimless and motiveless information sharing may not work or even degrade the cooperative performance. Typically, the multi-agent communication behaviors are motivated by extrinsic rewards from environment. We conclude the mechanism as 'Communicate what rewards you'. In this work, we present a novel communication mechanism called Intrinsic Motivated Multi-Agent Communication (IMMAC). Our key insight can be summarized as 'Communicate what surprises you'. Concretely, we use an observation-dependent intrinsic value to represent the importance of observed information. Then a gating mechanism and an attentional mechanism based on intrinsic values are designed to control communication. By encouraging agent to communicate and focus on the observations with uncertain and important information, our algorithm achieves superior communication efficiency and cooperative performance. We evaluate IMMAC on a variety of challenging tasks, and demonstrate that intrinsic values are sufficient to drive efficient communication behaviors. Moreover, we found that the combination of intrinsic values and extrinsic values can further improve the communication efficiency. Consequently, intrinsic motivation is a promising way to control communication and it is capable of being a good complement to the existing extrinsic motivated communication methods.

Intrinsic Motivated Multi-Agent Communication

This paper focuses on the multi-agent credit assignment problem. We propose a novel multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm called 
 (MICRA) and a three-phase framework for training, adaptation, and execution of MICRA. The key features are: (1) a 
 is proposed to optimize the target agents' policy; (2) a meta-imitator is designed to infer the external agents' policies. Results show that MICRA outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms.

Fast Adaptation to External Agents via Meta Imitation Counterfactual Regret Advantage

In many distributed systems, from cloud to sensor networks, different configurations impact system performance, while strongly depending on the network topology. Hence, topological changes may entail costly reconfiguration and optimisation processes. This paper proposes a multi-agent solution for recovering a network's topology in case of node failures. The proposed approach relies on local information about the network's topology, collected and disseminated at runtime. Two strategies for distributing topological data are studied: one based on Mobile Agents (our proposal) and the other based on Trickle (a reference gossiping protocol from the literature). These two strategies were adapted for our self-healing approach, to collect topological information for network recovery; and were evaluated in terms of resource overheads. Experimental results show that both variants can recover the network topology, up to a certain node failure rate, which depends on the network topology. At the same time, Mobile Agents collect less information, focusing on local dissemination, which suffices for network recovery. This entails less bandwidth overheads than when Trickle is used. Still, Mobile Agents utilise more memory and exchange more messages during data-collection than Trickle does. These results validate the viability of the proposed self-healing solution, offering two variant implementations with diverse performance characteristics, which may suit different application domains.

A Decentralised Self-Healing Approach for Network Topology Maintenance (JAAMAS Track)

Sequential decision making techniques hold great promise to improve the performance of many real-world systems, but computational complexity hampers their principled application. Influence-based abstraction aims to gain leverage by modeling local subproblems together with the 'influence' that the rest of the system exerts on them. While computing exact representations of such influence might be intractable, learning approximate representations offers a promising approach to enable scalable solutions. This paper investigates the performance of such approaches from a theoretical perspective. The primary contribution is the derivation of sufficient conditions on approximate influence representations that can guarantee solutions with small value loss. In particular we show that neural networks trained with cross entropy are well suited to learn approximate influence representations. Moreover, we provide a sample based formulation of the bounds, which reduces the gap to applications. Finally, driven by our theoretical insights, we propose approximation error estimators, which empirically reveal to correlate well with the value loss.

Loss Bounds for Approximate Influence-Based Abstraction

Distributed training architectures have been shown to be effective to improve the performance of reinforcement learning algorithms. However, their performances are still poor for problems with sparse rewards, e.g., the scoring task with or without goalkeeper for robots in RoboCup soccer. It is challenging to solve these tasks in reinforcement learning, especially for those that require combining high-level actions with flexible control. To address these challenges, we introduce a distributed training framework with parallel curriculum experience replay that can collect different experiences in parallel and then automatically identify the difficulty of these subtasks. Experiments on the domain of simulated RoboCup soccer show that, the approach is effective and outperforms existing reinforcement learning methods.

Parallel Curriculum Experience Replay in Distributed Reinforcement Learning

The literature in modern machine learning has only negative results for learning to communicate between competitive agents using standard RL. We introduce a modified sender-receiver game to study the spectrum of partially-competitive scenarios and show communication can indeed emerge in a competitive setting. We empirically demonstrate three key takeaways for future research. First, we show that communication is proportional to cooperation, and it can occur for partially competitive scenarios using standard learning algorithms. Second, we highlight the difference between communication and manipulation and extend previous metrics of communication to the competitive case. Third, we investigate the negotiation game where previous work failed to learn communication between independent agents (Cao et al, 2018). We show that, in this setting, both agents must benefit from communication for it to emerge; and, with a slight modification to the game, we demonstrate successful communication between competitive agents. We hope this work overturns misconceptions and inspires more research in competitive emergent communication. Code is available at http://github.com/mnoukhov/emergent-compete

Emergent Communication under Competition

Among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis are centrality measures, which quantify the importance of every node in the network. This centrality analysis typically disregards the possibility that the network may have been deliberately manipulated to mislead the analysis. To solve this problem, a recent study attempted to understand how a member of a social network could rewire the connections therein to avoid being identified as a leader of that network. However, the study was based on the assumption that the network analyzer-the seeker-is oblivious to any evasion attempts by the evader. In this paper, we relax this assumption by modelling the seeker and evader as strategic players in a Bayesian Stackelberg game. In this context, we study the complexity of various optimization problems, and analyze the equilibria of the game under different assumptions, thereby drawing the first conclusions in the literature regarding which centralities the seeker should use to maximize the chances of detecting a strategic evader.

Safe Pareto Improvements for Delegated Game Playing

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Pick Your Battles: Interaction Graphs as Population-Level Objectives for Strategic Diversity

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Safe Pareto Improvements for Delegated Game Playing

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Next from AAMAS 2021

Pick Your Battles: Interaction Graphs as Population-Level Objectives for Strategic Diversity

Similar lecture

The Price is (Probably) Right: Learning Market Equilibria from Samples

Stay up to date with the latest Underline news!

PRESENTATIONS

CONFERENCES

COMPANY

RESOURCES

Downloads