United Kingdom

The real world is awash with multi-agent problems that require collective action by self-interested agents, from the routing of packets across a computer network to the management of irrigation systems. Such systems have local incentives for individuals, whose behavior has an impact on the global outcome for the group. Given appropriate mechanisms describing agent interaction, groups may achieve socially beneficial outcomes, even in the face of short-term selfish incentives. In many cases, collective action problems possess an underlying graph structure, whose topology crucially determines the relationship between local decisions and emergent global effects. Such scenarios have received great attention through the lens of network games. However, this abstraction typically collapses important dimensions, such as geometry and time, relevant to the design of mechanisms promoting cooperation. In parallel work, multi-agent deep reinforcement learning has shown great promise in modelling the emergence of self-organized cooperation in complex gridworld domains. Here we apply this paradigm in graph-structured collective action problems.

AAMAS 2021

Modelling Cooperation in Network Games with Spatio-Temporal Complexity

AAMAS is the largest and most influential conference in the area of agents and multiagent systems, bringing together researchers and practitioners in all areas of agent technology and providing and internationally renowned high-profile forum for publishing and finding out about the latest developments in the field. AAMAS is the flagship conference of the non-profit International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).  

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poster

Multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) has achieved a remarkable amount of success in solving various types of video games. A cornerstone of this success is the auto-curriculum framework, which shapes the learning process by continually creating new challenging tasks for agents to adapt to, thereby facilitating the acquisition of new skills. In order to extend MARL methods to real-world domains outside of video games, we envision in this blue sky paper that maintaining a diversity-aware auto-curriculum is critical for successful MARL applications. Specifically, we argue that <i>behavioural diversity</i> is a pivotal, yet under-explored, component for real-world multiagent learning systems, and that significant work remains in understanding how to design a diversity-aware auto-curriculum. We list four open challenges for auto-curriculum techniques, which we believe deserve more attention from this community. Towards validating our vision, we recommend modelling realistic interactive behaviours in autonomous driving as an important test bed, and recommend the SMARTS/ULTRA benchmark.

Diverse Auto-Curriculum is Critical for Successful Real-World Multiagent Learning Systems (Blue Sky Ideas Track)

Institutions and investors face the constant challenge of making accurate decisions and predictions regarding how best they should distribute their endowments. The problem of achieving an optimal outcome at minimal cost has been extensively studied and resolved using several heuristics. However, these works fail to address how an external decision maker can target different types of fair behaviour and how limited information can shape this complex interplay. Here, we consider the well-known Ultimatum game in a spatial setting and propose a hierarchy of interference mechanisms based on the amount of information available to the external decision maker and desired standards of fairness. Our key findings show that asymmetric interactions have drastically different dynamics when compared to symmetric games, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, and discuss why gathering information about the agents' behaviour allows for the most efficient investment strategies.

Promoting Fair Proposers, Fair Responders or Both? Cost-Efficient Interference in the Spatial Ultimatum Game

Trading mechanisms play a fundamental role in the health of financial markets. For example, it is believed that continuous double auctions constitute fertile soil for predatory behaviour and toxic order flows. To this end, frequent call markets have been proposed as an alternative design choice to address the latency arbitrage opportunities built in those markets. This paper studies the extent to which adaptive rules to define the length of the clearing intervals affect the performance of frequent call markets.

Call Markets with Adaptive Clearing Intervals

Search has played a fundamental role in computer game research since the very beginning.   And while online search has been commonly used in perfect information games such as Chess and Go, online search methods for imperfect information games have only been introduced relatively recently. This paper addresses the question of what is a sound online algorithm in an imperfect information setting of two-player zero-sum games? We argue that the fixed-strategy definitions of exploitability and epsilon-Nash equilibria are ill suited to measure the worst-case performance of an online algorithm. We thus formalize epsilon-soundness, a concept that connects the worst-case performance of an online algorithm to the performance of an epsilon-Nash equilibrium. Our definition of soundness and the consistency hierarchy finally provide appropriate tools to analyze online algorithms in repeated imperfect information games.  We thus inspect some of the previous online algorithms in a new light, bringing new insights into their worst case performance guarantees.

Sound Algorithms in Imperfect Information Games

From employment contracts to climate agreements, individuals often engage in groups that must reach decisions with varying levels of fairness. These dilemmas also pervade AI, e.g. in automated negotiation, conflict resolution or resource allocation. As evidenced by the Ultimatum Game, payoff maximization is frequently at odds with fairness. Eliciting equality in populations of self-regarding agents thus requires judicious interventions. Here we use knowledge about agents’ social networks to implement fairness mechanisms, in the context of Multiplayer Ultimatum Games. We show that preferentially attributing the role of Proposer to low-connected nodes enhances fairness. We further show that, when high-degree must be the Proposers, stricter voting rules (i.e., requiring consensus for collectives to accept a proposal) reduce unfairness.

Eliciting Fairness in Multiplayer Bargaining through Network-Based Role Assignment

In robotics, it is often not possible to learn useful policies using pure model-free reinforcement learning without significant reward shaping or  curriculum learning. As a consequence, many researchers rely on expert demonstrations to guide learning. However, acquiring expert  demonstrations can be expensive. This paper proposes an alternative approach where the solutions of previously solved tasks are used to produce an action prior that can facilitate exploration in future tasks. The action prior is a probability distribution over actions that summarizes the set of policies found solving previous tasks. Our results indicate that this approach can be used to solve robotic manipulation problems that would otherwise be infeasible without expert demonstrations. Source code is available at https://github.com/ondrejba/action_priors.

Action Priors for Large Action Spaces in Robotics

In a multi-agent system where agents provide quantifiable work for each other on a voluntary basis, reputation mechanisms are incorporated to induce cooperation. Hereby agents assign their peers numerical scores based on their reported transaction histories. In such systems, adversaries can launch an attack by creating fake identities called Sybils, who report counterfeit transactions among one another, with the aim of increasing their own scores in the eyes of others. This  paper provides new results about the Sybil-proofness of reputation mechanisms. We revisit the impossibility result of Seuken and Parkes (2011), who show that strongly-beneficial Sybil attacks cannot be prevented on reputation mechanisms satisfying three particular requirements. We prove that, under a more rigorous set of definitions of Sybil attack benefit, this result no longer holds. We characterise  properties under which reputation mechanisms are susceptible to strongly-beneficial Sybil attacks. Building on our results, we propose a minimal set of requirements for reputation mechanisms to achieve resistance to such attacks, which are stronger   than the results by Cheng and Friedman (2005), who show Sybil-proofness of certain asymmetric reputation mechanisms.

Achieving Sybil-Proofness in Distributed Work Systems

Evolutionary strategies (ES) and off-policy learning algorithms are two major workhorses of Reinforcement learning (RL): ES adopt a simple blackbox approach to optimization but it can be slightly more sample inefficient; off-policy learning is by design more sample efficient but the updates can be unstable. Motivated by their trade-offs, we propose CEM-ACER, a combination of Cross-entropy method, a standard ES algorithm, and Actor-critic with experience replay (ACER), an off-policy actor-critic algorithm. Our proposal relies on a key insight: off-policy algorithms provide a natural mechanism to efficiently evolve parameter populations as part of an ES algorithm. Across a wide range of benchmark control tasks, we show that CEM-ACER balances the strengths of CEM and ACER, leading to an algorithm that consistently outperforms its individual building blocks, as well as other competitive baseline algorithms.

Guiding Evolutionary Strategies with Off-Policy Actor-Critic

A key issue in artificial intelligence methods for interactive preference elicitation is choosing at each stage an appropriate query to the user, in order to find a near-optimal solution as quickly as possible. A theoretically attractive method is to choose a query that minimises max setwise regret (which corresponds to the worst case loss response in terms of value of information). We focus here on the situation in which the choices are represented explicitly in a database, and with a model of user utility as a weighted sum of the criteria; in this case when the user makes a choice, an agent learns a linear constraint on the unknown vector of weights. We develop an algorithmic method for computing minimax setwise regret for this form of preference model, by making use of a SAT solver with cardinality constraints to prune the search space, and computing max setwise regret using an extreme points method. Our experimental results demonstrate the feasibility of the approach and the very substantial speed up over the state of the art.

Efficient Exact Computation of Setwise Minimax Regret for Interactive Preference Elicitation

In this paper, we propose solid semantics  to obtain the most acceptable sets of arguments. Besides, we study the application of solid semantics in the field of judgement aggregation.

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Diverse Auto-Curriculum is Critical for Successful Real-World Multiagent Learning Systems (Blue Sky Ideas Track)

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