technical paper
Anchoring Theory in Sequential Stackelberg Games
DOI: 10.48448/mx5j-0154
An underlying assumption of Stackelberg Games (SGs) is perfect rationality of the players. However, in real-life situations the followers (thieves, poachers, smugglers), as humans in general, may act not in a perfectly rational way, since their decisions may be affected by biases of various kinds which bound rationality of their decisions. One of the popular models of bounded rationality is Anchoring Theory (AT) which claims that humans have a tendency to flatten probabilities of available options, i.e. they perceive a distribution of these probabilities as being closer to the uniform distribution than it really is. We propose an efficient formulation of AT in sequential extensive-form SGs suitable for Mixed-Integer Linear Program solution methods and compare the results of its implementation in five state-of-the-art methods for solving sequential SGs.