AAAI 2026

January 24, 2026

Singapore, Singapore

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We study fair allocations of {\em indivisible} goods among agents with heterogeneous monotone valuations. As fair we consider the allocations that are envy-free-up-to-any-good (EFX). Finding if EFX allocations always exist, even for agents with additive valuations, is a major open problem in Fair Division. Christodoulou et al. (2023) introduced the (multi-hyper)graph setting, where agents and goods are represented by vertices and edges of a graph, respectively, and only the endpoints of an edge may have non-zero marginal value for it. We show that for \textit{hypergraphs} with girth at least 4 and agents with \textit{general monotone} valuations there always exists an EFX allocation and can be constructed in polynomial time. We generalize our approach to also show that multi-hypergraphs with girth (on the simple hypergraph) at least 4 always admit an EFX allocation, as long as there exists a single vertex whose adjacent edges have multiplicity at most the size of that edge minus 2; our construction in this case needs pseudo-polynomial time.

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