AAAI 2026

January 22, 2026

Singapore, Singapore

Would you like to see your presentation here, made available to a global audience of researchers?
Add your own presentation or have us affordably record your next conference.

We study a sequential selling problem in which an agent receives daily offers to sell a good, incurs a holding cost each day, and is subject to sunk cost bias---allowing past, irrecoverable costs to influence present decisions. We introduce a formal model parameterizing the degree of sunk cost bias and distinguish between three behavioral types: optimistic (who ignore future bias), naive (who assume their current bias persists), and sophisticated (who anticipate the evolution of their own bias). For each type, we characterize the optimal selling strategy and precisely quantify the worst-case gap in expected objective profit compared to an unbiased agent. Our results show that optimistic agents can suffer a quadratic loss in profit due to excessive waiting, naive agents perform identically to unbiased agents, and sophisticated agents limit their losses to a linear function of the time horizon. These findings clarify how different anticipations of sunk cost bias affect sequential decision-making and suggest targeted interventions to mitigate inefficiency.

Downloads

SlidesPaperTranscript English (automatic)

Next from AAAI 2026

Retriever Encoder Selection Matters for In-Context Learning-based Medical Segmentation
poster

Retriever Encoder Selection Matters for In-Context Learning-based Medical Segmentation

AAAI 2026

+1
Yongshun Gong and 3 other authors

22 January 2026

Stay up to date with the latest Underline news!

Select topic of interest (you can select more than one)

PRESENTATIONS

  • All Presentations
  • For Librarians
  • Resource Center
  • Free Trial
Underline Science, Inc.
1216 Broadway, 2nd Floor, New York, NY 10001, USA

© 2025 Underline - All rights reserved