Would you like to see your presentation here, made available to a global audience of researchers?
Add your own presentation or have us affordably record your next conference.
We study how the design of testing institutions, encompassing both the tests themselves and the procedures used to administer them, shapes selection outcomes in environments with multiple criteria and strategic agents. We model the testing agency as either a set of independent bureaucracies (each test administered separately) or a joint bureaucracy (where test order and personalization can be coordinated). Our mechanism design analysis shows that under a joint bureaucracy, fixed-order sequential mechanisms with stringent tests are optimal for maximizing the probability mass of qualified candidates selected. Furthermore, we demonstrate that personalizing tests through upfront communication, now increasingly feasible via AI and automation, can select all qualified candidates. Finally, we compare institutional settings and quantify the value of controlling test order, showing that the benefit depends critically on the distribution of testees and the stringency of optimal tests. Our results contribute to the design of robust, efficient, and fair testing systems in both human and AI-mediated environments.