We introduce a new notion of deterministic stable solution for non-cooperative games, termed subsidized equilibrium. It assumes that an amount of money can be used as a pool of subsidies to stabilize a strategy profile that otherwise would not be accepted by (some of) the players. Roughly speaking, for a given amount of money, a strategy profile is a subsidized equilibrium if the total payoff loss incurred by players not playing best-responses does not exceed that amount, i.e., there is enough money to refund all players experiencing a regret. With respect to many other solution concepts in the literature, the notion of subsidized equilibrium has important advantages. Specifically, for a sufficiently high value of money, a subsidized equilibrium always exists and can even be computed in polynomial time; also, existence of an efficient subsidized equilibrium can be guaranteed. Thus, determining for which amounts of money existence, polynomial time computability and efficiency can or cannot be achieved becomes an intriguing question. We provide initial results towards this direction for some widely studied classes of games.