AAAI 2026

January 22, 2026

Singapore, Singapore

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Voting is one of the most prominent applications of preference aggregation and computational social choice. While much of the literature focuses on models involving discrete candidates, there has been a growing interest in voting over divisible resources, such as budget, space, and time. In this survey, we review existing work on voting in divisible settings, including fundamental models of budget aggregation, fair mixing, and cake sharing. We also establish connections among these models, highlight unifying themes across different frameworks, and suggest directions for future research.

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Next from AAAI 2026

Multi-Objective Search: Algorithms, Applications, and Emerging Directions
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Multi-Objective Search: Algorithms, Applications, and Emerging Directions

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Ariel Felner and 3 other authors

22 January 2026

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