Austria

Fingerprinting large language models (LLMs) is essential for verifying model ownership, ensuring authenticity, and preventing misuse. Traditional fingerprinting methods often require significant computational overhead or whitebox verification access. In this paper, we introduce UTF, a novel and efficient approach to fingerprinting LLMs by leveraging undertrained tokens. Under-trained tokens are tokens that the model has not fully learned during its training phase. By utilizing these tokens, we perform supervised fine-tuning to embed specific input-output pairs into the model. This process allows the LLM to produce predetermined outputs when presented with certain inputs, effectively embedding a unique fingerprint. Our method has minimal overhead and impact on model’s performance, and does not require white-box access to target model’s ownership identification. Compared to existing fingerprinting methods, UTF is also more effective and robust to fine-tuning and random guess.

ACL 2025

UTF: Under-trained Tokens as Fingerprints —— A Novel Approach to LLM Identification

### Welcome to The 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL 2025)

Message from the General Chair: 
*It is my great pleasure and honor to welcome you to the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL 2025), held in beautiful Vienna, Austria, from July 27 to August 1, 2025. ACL2025continues our field’s tradition of excellence in scholarship, innovation, and inclusivity, and I am deeply grateful to the many volunteers who have worked tirelessly to bring this event to life.* 
[Read more](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GI_hvOpjswAuYdUTromfeDiPpCcqidwg/view?usp=sharing)

To access this event page, you need to log in with the **email address you registered with**. Access credentials will be sent to your email from Underline - subject line "Welcome to ACL 2025". Please be sure to check your spam email folder if you do not see an email confirmation right away.

Please log in

To access this event page, you need to log in with the **email address you registered with**. 

Welcome to The 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL 2025)

workshop paper

In this paper, we show it is possible to bypass the safety guardrails of large language models (LLMs) through a humorous prompt including the unsafe request. In particular, our method does not edit the unsafe request and follows a fixed template—it is simple to implement and does not need additional LLMs to craft prompts. Extensive experiments show the effectiveness of our method across different LLMs. We also show that both removing and adding more humor to our method can reduce its effectiveness—excessive humor possibly distracts the LLM from fulfilling its unsafe request. Thus, we argue that LLM jailbreaking occurs when there is a proper balance between focus on the unsafe request and presence of humor.

Using Humor to Bypass Safety Guardrails in Large Language Models

Recent advancements in model architectures and length extrapolation techniques have significantly extended the context length of large language models (LLMs), paving the way for their application in increasingly complex tasks. However, despite the growing capabilities of long-context LLMs, the safety issues in long-context scenarios remain underexplored. While safety alignment in short context has been widely studied, the safety concerns of long-context LLMs have not been adequately addressed. In this work, we introduce \textbf{LongSafety}, a comprehensive safety alignment dataset for long-context LLMs, containing 8 tasks and 17k samples, with an average length of 40.9k tokens. Our experiments demonstrate that training with LongSafety can enhance long-context safety performance while enhancing short-context safety and preserving general capabilities. Furthermore, we demonstrate that long-context safety does not equal long-context alignment with short-context safety data and LongSafety has generalizing capabilities in context length and long-context safety scenarios.

LongSafety: Enhance Safety for Long-Context LLMs

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in math problem-solving tasks, their robustness to noisy inputs is not well-studied. We propose \textbf{ArithmAttack} to examine how robust the LLMs are when they encounter noisy prompts that contain extra noise in the form of punctuation marks. While being easy to implement, ArithmAttack does not cause any information loss since words are not added or deleted from the context. We evaluate the robustness of eight LLMs, including LLama3, Mistral, Mathstral, and DeepSeek on noisy GSM8K and MultiArith datasets. Our experiments suggest that all the studied models show vulnerability to such noise, with more noise leading to poorer performances.

ArithmAttack: Evaluating Robustness of LLMs to Noisy Context in Math Problem Solving

Large Language Models (LLMs) have rapidly become integral to numerous applications in critical domains where reliability is paramount. Despite significant advances in safety frameworks and guardrails, current protective measures exhibit crucial vulnerabilities, particularly in multilingual contexts. Existing safety systems remain susceptible to adversarial attacks in low-resource languages and through code-switching techniques, primarily due to their English-centric design. Furthermore, the development of effective multilingual guardrails is constrained by the scarcity of diverse cross-lingual training data. Even recent solutions like Llama Guard-3, while offering multilingual support, lack transparency in their decision-making processes. We address these challenges by introducing X-Guard agent, a transparent multilingual safety agent designed to provide content moderation across diverse linguistic contexts. X-Guard effectively defends against both conventional low-resource language attacks and sophisticated code-switching attacks. Our approach includes: curating and enhancing multiple open-source safety datasets with explicit evaluation rationales; employing a jury of judges methodology to mitigate individual judge LLM provider biases; creating a comprehensive multilingual safety dataset spanning 132 languages with 5 million data points; and developing a two-stage architecture combining a custom-finetuned mBART-50 translation module with an evaluation X-Guard 3B model trained through supervised finetuning and GRPO training. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate X-Guard's effectiveness in detecting unsafe content across multiple languages while maintaining transparency throughout the safety evaluation process. Our work represents a significant advancement in creating robust, transparent, and linguistically inclusive safety systems for LLMs and its integrated systems. We have publicly released our dataset and models at this \href{https://github.com/UNHSAILLab/X-Guard-Multilingual-Guard-Agent-for-Content-Moderation/tree/main}{URL}

X-Guard: Multilingual Guard Agent for Content Moderation

Language model deployments in consumer-facing applications introduce numerous risks. While existing research on harms and hazards of such applications follows top-down approaches derived from regulatory frameworks and theoretical analyses, empirical evidence of real-world failure modes remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce RealHarm, a dataset of annotated problematic interactions with AI agents built from a systematic review of publicly reported incidents. Analyzing harms, causes, and hazards specifically from the deployer's perspective, we find that reputational damage constitutes the predominant organizational harm, while misinformation emerges as the most common hazard category. We empirically evaluate state-of-the-art guardrails and content moderation systems to probe whether such systems would have prevented the incidents, revealing a significant gap in the protection of AI applications.

RealHarm: A Collection of Real-World Language Model Application Failures

Large Language Models (LLMs) guardrail systems are designed to protect against prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. However, they remain vulnerable to evasion techniques. We demonstrate two approaches for bypassing LLM prompt injection and jailbreak detection systems via traditional character injection methods and algorithmic Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) evasion techniques. Through testing against six prominent protection systems, including Microsoft's Azure Prompt Shield and Meta's Prompt Guard, we show that both methods can be used to evade detection while maintaining adversarial utility achieving in some instances up to 100% evasion success. Furthermore, we demonstrate that adversaries can enhance Attack Success Rates (ASR) against black-box targets by leveraging word importance ranking computed by offline white-box models. Our findings reveal vulnerabilities within current LLM protection mechanisms and highlight the need for more robust guardrail systems.

Bypassing LLM Guardrails: An Empirical Analysis of Evasion Attacks against Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Detection Systems

Fine-tuning a general-purpose large language model (LLM) for a specific domain or task has become a routine procedure for ordinary users. However, fine-tuning is known to remove the safety alignment features of the model, even when the fine-tuning data does not contain any harmful content. We consider this to be a critical failure mode of LLMs due to the widespread uptake of fine-tuning, combined with the benign nature of the "attack". Most well-intentioned developers are likely unaware that they are deploying an LLM with reduced safety. On the other hand, this known vulnerability can be easily exploited by malicious actors intending to bypass safety guardrails. To make any meaningful progress in mitigating this issue, we first need reliable and reproducible safety evaluations. In this work, we investigate how robust a safety benchmark is to trivial variations in the experimental procedure, and the stochastic nature of LLMs. Our initial experiments expose surprising variance in the results of the safety evaluation, even when seemingly inconsequential changes are made to the fine-tuning setup. Our observations have serious implications for how researchers in this field should report results to enable meaningful comparisons in the future.

Fine-Tuning Lowers Safety and Disrupts Evaluation Consistency

The increasing capability of large language models (LLMs) to generate synthetic content has heightened concerns about their misuse, driving the development of Machine-Generated Text (MGT) detection models. However, these detectors face significant challenges due to the lack of high-quality synthetic datasets for training. To address this issue, we propose SPADE, a structured framework for detecting synthetic dialogues using prompt-based positive and negative samples. Our proposed methods yield 14 new dialogue datasets, which we benchmark against eight MGT detection models. The results demonstrate improved generalization performance when utilizing a mixed dataset produced by proposed augmentation frameworks, offering a practical approach to enhancing LLM application security. Considering that real-world agents lack knowledge of future opponent utterances, we simulate online dialogue detection and examine the relationship between chat history length and detection accuracy. Our open-source datasets, code and prompts can be downloaded from this https URL.

SPADE: Structured Prompting Augmentation for Dialogue Enhancement in Machine-Generated Text Detection

The introduction of advanced reasoning capabilities have improved the problem-solving performance of large language models, particularly on math and coding benchmarks. However, it remains unclear whether these reasoning models are more or less vulnerable to adversarial prompt attacks than their non-reasoning counterparts. In this work, we present a systematic evaluation of weaknesses in advanced reasoning models compared to similar non-reasoning models across a diverse set of prompt-based attack categories. Using experimental data, we find that on average the reasoning-augmented models are slightly more robust than non-reasoning models (42.51% vs 45.53% attack success rate, lower is better). However, this overall trend masks significant category-specific differences: for certain attack types the reasoning models are substantially more vulnerable (e.g., up to 32 percentage points worse on a tree-of-attacks prompt), while for others they are markedly more robust (e.g., 29.8 points better on cross-site scripting injection). Our findings highlight the nuanced security implications of advanced reasoning in language models and emphasize the importance of stress-testing safety across diverse adversarial techniques.

Weakest Link in the Chain: Security Vulnerabilities in Advanced Reasoning Models

Prompt injection remains a major security risk for large language models. However, the efficacy of existing guardrail models in context-aware settings remains underexplored, as they often rely on static attack benchmarks. Additionally, they have over-defense tendencies. We introduce CAPTURE, a novel context-aware benchmark assessing both attack detection and over-defense tendencies with minimal in-domain examples. Our experiments reveal that current prompt injection guardrail models suffer from high false negatives in adversarial cases and excessive false positives in benign scenarios, highlighting critical limitations. To demonstrate our framework's utility, we train CaptureGuard on our generated data. This new model drastically reduces both false negative and false positive rates on our context-aware datasets while also generalizing effectively to external benchmarks, establishing a path toward more robust and practical prompt injection defenses.

Downloads

Next from ACL 2025

Using Humor to Bypass Safety Guardrails in Large Language Models

Similar lecture

MEraser: An Effective Fingerprint Erasure Approach for Large Language Models

Stay up to date with the latest Underline news!

PRESENTATIONS

CONFERENCES

COMPANY

RESOURCES

.css-70qvj9{display:-webkit-box;display:-webkit-flex;display:-ms-flexbox;display:flex;-webkit-align-items:center;-webkit-box-align:center;-ms-flex-align:center;align-items:center;}Downloads

Next from ACL 2025

Using Humor to Bypass Safety Guardrails in Large Language Models

Similar lecture

MEraser: An Effective Fingerprint Erasure Approach for Large Language Models

Stay up to date with the latest Underline news!

PRESENTATIONS

CONFERENCES

COMPANY

RESOURCES

Downloads