keywords:
comparative analysis
cognitive architectures
psychology
artificial intelligence
reasoning
The cognitive mechanism by which Large Language Models (LLMs) solve mathematical problems remains a widely debated and unresolved issue. Currently, there is little interpretable experimental evidence that connects LLMs' problem-solving with human cognitive psychology. To determine whether LLMs possess human-like mathematical reasoning, we modified the problems used in the human Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Our results show that even with the use of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompts, mainstream LLMs, including the o1 model (noted for its reasoning capabilities), have a high error rate when solving these modified CRT problems. Specifically, the average accuracy rate dropped by up to 50% compared to the original problems. Further analysis of LLMs' incorrect answers suggests that they primarily rely on pattern matching from their training data, which aligns more with human intuition (System 1 thinking) rather than with human-like reasoning (System 2 thinking). This finding challenges the belief that LLMs have genuine mathematical reasoning abilities comparable to humans. As a result, this work may adjust overly optimistic views on LLMs' progress toward Artificial General Intelligence.